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Abstract:
The European Union is a rules-based international organisation, with an 
exceptionally dense legal system. Likewise, the ways in which EU law 
has effects in domestic law are determined by (constitutional) law. The 
legal rights and obligations entailed for state and third sector entities, 
companies and human beings of some 45 years of membership have had 
significant effects on domestic health law across the UK, even though 
health per se is a national comp tence. That said, the EUs relationships 
with national legal orders are also determined by the politically possible. 
We therefore sketch the key legal questions for UK health law, and 
health law in each of the devolveds, in two possible immediate post-
Brexit futures. By immediate future, we mean after 29 March 2019, the 
date on which the Article 50 TEU notification period ends.  It will not be 
possible to answer these legal questions until the politics have 
crystallised into legal texts, which is not the case at the time we write. 
We go on to argue that the ways in which UK health law, policy and 
practice are currently determined by the UKs membership of the EU, 
coupled with the short time frame within which the future EU-UK 
relationship must be determined, mean that law may be expected to be 
less of a determinant in immediate post-Brexit futures than it is at 
present. Our principal conclusion is that the uncertainties that surround 
the process of Brexit mean that at a level of specific policy and practice, 
such as in areas of health law, we might expect a period of a-legality, 
where the legal position of actors does not necessarily determine or 
explain their actions. 
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The immediate futures of health law after Brexit:
Law, A-legality, and Uncertainty
Tamara Hervey, University of Sheffield and Elizabeth M Speakman, University of 
Birmingham*
Abstract
The European Union is a rules-based international organisation, with an 
exceptionally dense legal system. Likewise, the ways in which EU law has effects in 
domestic law are determined by (constitutional) law. The legal rights and 
obligations entailed for state and third sector entities, companies and human 
beings of some 45 years of membership have had significant effects on domestic 
health law across the UK, even though health per se is a national competence. That 
said, the EUs relationships with national legal orders are also determined by the 
politically possible. We therefore sketch the key legal questions for UK health law, 
and health law in each of the devolveds, in two possible immediate post-Brexit 
futures. By immediate future, we mean after 29 March 2019, the date on which the 
Article 50 TEU notification period ends.  It will not be possible to answer these legal 
questions until the politics have crystallised into legal texts, which is not the case at 
the time we write. We go on to argue that the ways in which UK health law, policy 
and practice are currently determined by the UKs membership of the EU, coupled 
with the short time frame within which the future EU-UK relationship must be 
determined, mean that law may be expected to be less of a determinant in 
immediate post-Brexit futures than it is at present. Our principal conclusion is that 
the uncertainties that surround the process of Brexit mean that at a level of specific 
policy and practice, such as in areas of health law, we might expect a period of a-
legality, where the legal position of actors does not necessarily determine or 
explain their actions. 
INTRODUCTION
As with so many areas, legal uncertainty about health post-Exit Day is significant.  
Moreover, it is difficult even to determine the extent of the uncertainty.  On 29 
March 2019, we may see a significant rupture in the fabric of (health) law as we 
currently experience it in the UK. 
Given the high levels of legal uncertainty, and the compressed time-period forced by 
the processes mandated by Article 50 TEU which requires that the UK will leave the 
EU by 29 March 2019 unless a further transition period is agreed, we want to argue 
* We are grateful to Jean McHale and Mark Flear, the contributors to the workshops held under the 
ESRC funded project Health Law Outside the EU:  Immediate, Intermediate and Long Term Impacts, 
and to Jo Hunt, Steve Peers, Paul James Cardwell, Kenneth Armstrong, Nicholas Fahy, Sarah 
Woollaston MP, Martin McKee, and the many other people with whom we have discussed legal 
aspects of Brexit for health both in person and via social media.
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2
that legal centrism  at least in an unmodified form  is misplaced.  Rather, we want 
to explore the idea  familiar from socio-legal studies  that a practical desire among 
relevant communities for continuity and stability may involve the side-lining or 
even ignoring of formal legal positions.  Rather than the current situation in which 
law is centre-stage, we may see a period of a-legality, in which law is less 
determinative of social and economic relations than at present.
The article proceeds as follows. After a brief outline of what we encompass in post-
Exit Day UK health law, we consider some of the literature on legal centrism and 
how this applies in the context of EU law. The heart of the paper sets out the key 
legal questions for post-Brexit health law, policy and practice which will need to be 
answered once the relevant legal texts become available. Where it is possible to 
begin to answer those questions, we do so. Where appropriate, we refer readers to 
other articles in this special issue. Where there is legal text agreed in principle, we 
tentatively suggest what the answers would be, were that text to be legally adopted.  
But for the remainder, all we can do is set out the questions that will need to be 
answered, and indicate what the answers might be if certain possible futures are 
encapsulated in legal text. Here we consider two possible futures for post-Brexit 
health law: under a former Member State special relationship and under no 
Withdrawal Agreement.
The multiple uncertainties revealed by this exercise lead us to the final section of 
the article. Here we argue that the temporal aspects of leaving the EU mandated by 
Article 50,1 coupled with the particularly fragile domestic politics pertaining in 
Westminster under the May government,2 and in that governments relationships 
with the devolved governments in Wales, and especially in Scotland and Northern 
Ireland,3 are key to understanding health law immediately post Exit Day.  As there is 
insufficient time for technical legal details to be thought through and put in place, 
and because EU law has become such an embedded part of UK health policy and 
practice, we expect that the law will be less of a reflection of reality in the immediate 
post-Brexit period in the context of health than it is now.  What we envisage is a 
period of at least partial a-legality, where relationships seek to continue as before, 
even though the legal underpinnings for those relationships are either missing or 
1 See KA Armstrong, Brexit Time (CUP 2018); P Craig, The Process: Brexit And The Anatomy Of 
Article 50, in F Fabbrini (ed) The Law and Politics of Brexit (OUP 2017), Ch 3; Oxford Legal Studies 
Research Paper No 37/2017.
2 For example, the outcome of the 2017 general election which left the Conservative government with 
a reduced majority and reliance on the Northern Irish Democratic Unionist Party.  Also, continuing 
political pressure within the Conservative party from Tory remainers and right wing groups such as 
the European Research Group. See H Stewart, Were The Opposition: Rees-Mogg And His European 
Research Group The Guardian (2018) 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/jul/20/opposition-jacob-rees-mogg-european-
research-group-profile accessed 1 September 2018. 
3 See, e.g., S Douglas-Scott, Brexit and the Scottish Question and J Doyle and E Connolly, Brexit and 
the Northern Ireland Question, in F Fabbrini (ed) The Law and Politics of Brexit (OUP 2017), Ch 6; J 
Hunt, Devolution in M Dougan (ed) The UK after Brexit: Legal and Policy Challenges (Intersentia 
2017).
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3
highly uncertain.  This leads us to our conclusion, that we should neither understate 
nor overstate the importance of law in post-Brexit health law, policy and practice.
EU HEALTH LAW AND LEGAL CENTRISM
Although the precise scope of EU health law and policy is determined slightly 
differently by different authors,4 there is broad agreement about what it 
encompasses.  EU law has affected health law, policy and practice in the UK through 
two main mechanisms: the adoption of binding EU legislation in health fields, and 
the application of measures of more general EU law in health contexts.  The latter is 
longer standing; the former enjoys a higher profile in academic literature and policy 
discussions.  
In brief, the scope of EU health law includes law affecting people (professionals, 
patients); products (medicines, devices, equipment) and substances of human origin 
(blood, organs, tissues, cells); health systems; and public health.  EU law gives some 
entitlements to patients, to receive health care services across borders within the 
EU.  EU law governs the entitlements of healthcare professionals to take up 
employment or provide services across borders in the EU, through mutual 
recognition of medical qualifications, and through the rights of EU citizens and their 
families to live in any Member State and be treated as if they were nationals of that 
state.  EU employment law governs some aspects of the terms of employment of 
medical professionals, such as health and safety at work, including (controversially) 
working time.  All products marketed within the EU have to comply with EU trade 
law, which sets regulatory standards to protect consumers and ensure fair 
competition between traders, at the same time as ensuring that products can move 
freely throughout the EUs single market unencumbered by customs duties or 
measures having an equivalent chilling effect on cross-border trade.  These rules 
apply to medical devices and equipment used in the NHS.  They include rules on 
4 TK Hervey and JV McHale, Health Law and The European Union (CUP 2004); TK Hervey and JV 
McHale, European Union Health Law (CUP 2015); TK Hervey, CA Young and LE Bishop (eds), Research 
Handbook on EU Health Law and Policy (Edward Elgar Publishing 2017) 165-176; A den Exter and TK 
Hervey (eds), European Union Health Law: Treaties and Legislation (Maklu 2012); E Mossialos and 
others (eds), Health Systems Governance In Europe: the role of European law and policy (CUP 2010); 
SL Greer and P Kurzer (eds), European Union Public Health Policy: Regional and global trends 
(Routledge 2012).  HEGM Hermans, AF Casparie and JHP Paelinck,(eds) Health Care In Europe After 
1992 (Dartmouth 1992); CEM Normand and P Vaughan (eds), Europe Without Frontiers: The 
Implications For Health n London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine Public Health Forum 1992 
(Wiley 1993); E Randall, The European Union And Health Policy (Palgrave Macmillan 2001); TK 
Hervey, 'Mapping The Contours Of European Union Health Law And Policy' (2002) 8 European Public 
Law, p 69; R Busse, M Wismar and PC Berman (eds), The European Union And Health Services: the 
impact of the single European market on member states (IOS Press 2002); M McKee, E Mossialos and R 
Baeten (eds), The Impact Of EU Law On Health Care Systems (PIE - P Lang 2002); J W van de Gronden, 
The Treaty Provisions On Competition And Health Care, Health Care and EU Law (TMC Asser Press 
2011), p 265; L Hancher and W Sauter, EU Competition And Internal Market Law In The Health Care 
Sector (OUP 2012); A De Ruijter EU Health Law and Policy (OUP 2019 forthcoming).
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4
public procurement.  EU law requires pre-market authorization for medicines being 
put on the market in the EU, including within national health systems, through 
processes involving the European Medicines Agency or national authorisation 
bodies such as the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency.  EU law 
also regulates human blood, tissues, cells and organs, seeking to secure patient 
safety through traceability and accountability mechanisms.  Many aspects of medical 
and pre-medical research are covered by EU law, including data protection, clinical 
trials, and animal testing. EU law has made some attempts to embed bioethical 
standards, for instance in its rules on patentability of biomedical inventions. Some 
products that are harmful to human health are carefully regulated by EU law: 
chemicals, food, tobacco and alcohol being the key cases in point. Products from 
outside may not lawfully enter the EUs market without complying with EU-
determined standards. EU States which want to go further in protecting public 
health, by restricting certain types of trade practices, must justify their protective 
rules under EU law.5  EU agencies coordinate Member States action on 
communicable diseases, environmental factors, food safety and the like, including 
through exercising powers to take administrative decisions.  The EU coordinates 
with international bodies in many of these areas, to seek to secure global standards, 
for instance for medicines, food safety, tobacco control and communicable disease 
prevention.6
Studies of health systems, policies and practices within the EU pay due attention to 
these aspects of EU law that determine obligations and entitlements of the various 
actors concerned.  The law matters: it is a significant determinant of what happens 
and what is possible, for patients, health professionals, health care providers and 
national public health systems.  Although health is a national competence, EU law 
has nevertheless had significant effects on a great deal (though not all) of national 
health law. These effects have increased during the UKs 45 years of membership of 
the EU. They have increased as EU law itself has developed to encompass an ever 
wider range of matters concerned with health. But more importantly, they have also 
increased as the effects on health law of EU law concerned with trade, competition, 
employment, development and other areas of EU competence have been better 
understood. Some of that change has been driven by litigation. Some involves 
primary EU legislation, binding and applicable in UK law through the European 
Communities Act 1972. Much involves the dense web of EU administrative action 
and secondary law-making, as well as articulation of soft norms through 
collaborative decision-making involving national, EU and international regulatory 
entities.
EU law is thus a significant element of normative ordering7 for health policy and 
practice in the UK.  EU laws particular constitutional qualities accentuate this 
5 The Scottish rules on alcohol pricing are a case in point.
6 See TK Hervey and JV McHale, European Union Health Law (CUP 2015), Part IV, Chapter 16.
7 See, eg, Twinings definition of law as a species of institutionalised social practice that is oriented 
towards ordering relationships between subjects ..., W Twining, General Jurisprudence (CUP, 2009), p 
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5
significance: in many instances, EU health law entitlements can be enforced by 
individuals (companies, human beings) in domestic courts.  So, for instance, the 
ability of Mr Kohll to use litigation to secure dental treatment for his daughter in 
Germany, paid for by the Luxembourg health system,8 sent shock waves through 
health policy circles. It led to Mrs Watts successful (settled) litigation to have her 
hip operation in France paid for by the English NHS,9 and eventually to a reduction 
in some waiting times for elective procedures such as hip replacements, as NHS 
England changed its practice to allow primary care trusts to contract with private 
hospitals in England with unused capacity.10 
(EU) legal scholarship in general often operates on the assumption that the law, as 
set down by authorities such as legislatures and courts, determines the social 
reality.11  And yet this kind of legal centrism has been the subject of critique for 
decades, if not centuries.12  The law and society movement in the US, and socio-legal 
scholarship in the UK and elsewhere, have been decentring law and legal text since 
at least the 1960s. For instance, Ellicksons Order without Law13 shows how legal 
variations (in liability for cattle trespass) do not account for how people 
(neighbouring cattle ranchers) actually behave.  Informal norms and established 
practices can be weightier than formal written laws as tools to explain or predict 
behaviour.  The governance turn in legal scholarship in the US and beyond14 offered 
alternatives to legal centrism in EU legal scholarship.15  This trend continues, with, 
for instance, recent studies offering accounts of the EU with both international law 
117; see also K Sideri, Laws Practical Wisdom: The Theory and Practice of Law Making in New 
Governance Structures in the European Union (Ashgate, 2007).
8 Case C-158/96 Raymond Kohll v Union des caisses de maladie EU:C: 1998:171, [1998] ECR 1-01931.
9 Case C-372/04 Yvonne Watts v Bedford Primary Care Trust and Secretary of State for Health EU:C: 
2005:784, [2006] ECR 1-04325.
10 See TK Hervey, EU Health Law in C Barnard and S Peers, EU Law (OUP 2017), pp 632-633.
11 Every EU Law textbook is written on the basis of this (often unspoken) assumption. See further, e.g. 
M Cappelletti, et al, Integration Through Law (de Gruyter, 1985); JHH Weiler, The Transformation of 
Europe (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal 240383; G Garrett, The Politics of Legal Integration in the 
European Union 49 International Organization (1995) 17181; G Garrett, RD Keleman and H Schultz, 
The European Court of Justice, National Governments and Legal Integration in the European Union 
(1998) 52 International Organization 14976; M Poiares Maduro, We, the court: The European Court 
of Justice and the European Economic Constitution (Hart, 1998).
12 As Ellickson notes, the ideas date at least back to Tacitus, see R C Ellickson, The Aim of Order 
Without Law (1994) 150 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 97-100 at 98.
13 R C Ellickson, Order without Law: How Neighbours Settle Disputes (Harvard University Press, 1991); 
see also R C Ellickson, The household: informal order around the hearth (Princeton University Press, 
2008); B Yngvesson, Beastly Neighbours: Continuing Relations in Cattle Country (1993) 102 Yale 
Law Journal 1787801; B Yngvesson, Making Law at the Doorway: The Clerk, the Court and the 
Construction of Community in a New England Town (1988) 22 Law and Society Review 40948; P 
Ewick and SS Silbey, The Common Place of Law: Stories from Everyday Life (University of Chicago 
Press 1998).
14 See, e.g., O Loebel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in 
Contemporary Legal Thought (2004) 89 Minnesota Law Review 262390; CF Sabel and WH Simon, 
Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds (2004) 117 Harvard Law Review 1015
101; G de Búrca and J Scott (eds), Law and New Governance in the EU and the US (Hart, 2006); J Scott 
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6
and international relations in centre-frame.16  Law is not the only thing that matters, 
and law does not provide all the explanation we need to understand contemporary 
developments, or to undertake informed analysis of likely futures.
That said, neither do we want to understate the importance of law.  The EU is a 
rules-based organisation, and its interactions with its Member States and with third 
countries (states outside the EU) are based on legal texts, and legal rules about the 
EUs competences.  The EUs claim to be a body based on the rule of law is stronger 
than that of other international organisations.  The breadth and depth of EU law-
making, and the particular deference or accommodation given to the Court of Justice 
of the EU by domestic courts and courts of other organisations, such as the 
European Court of Human Rights, account for the difference. 
Moreover, some literature that decentres law pays insufficient attention to the ways 
that legal and non-legal logics interact,17 and especially roles of law as a shadow18 
or backstop to what appear to be informally or extra-legally determined 
relations.19  Even if law is not determinative of ordinary relationships, the 
possibility of recourse to law, and especially litigation, sits in the background, and 
conditions behaviours in important ways.
More recently, sociolegal scholarship has begun to take account of the roles of legal 
texts in a different way from classical or doctrinal legal centrism.  This newer 
scholarship seeks to explore how legal texts themselves act on social realities, 
and S Sturm, Courts as Catalysts: Re-Thinking the Judicial Role in New Governance (2007) 13 
Columbia Journal of European Law 56594; D NeJaime, When New Governance Fails (2009) 70 Ohio 
State Law Journal 32399; N Gunningham, The New Collaborative Environmental Governance: The 
Localization of Regulation (2009) 36 Journal of Law and Society 14566.
15 See, e.g. J Scott and DM Trubek, Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to Governance in the 
European Union (2002) 8 ELJ 118, at 915; G de Búrca and J Scott (eds), Law and New Governance 
in the EU and the US (Hart, 2006); G de Búrca and J Scott (eds) Narrowing the Gap? Law and New 
Approaches to Governance in the European Union (2007) Special Issue 13(3) Columbia Journal of 
European Law; T Hervey, The European Unions governance of healthcare and the welfare 
modernization agenda 2 Regulation and Governance (2008) 10320; T Hervey,  Adjudicating in the 
Shadow of the Informal Settlement?: The Court of Justice of the European Union, New Governance 
and Social Welfare Vol 63 Current Legal Problems (2010) 92-152; C.F. Sabel and J. Zeitlin (eds) 
(2010) Experimentalist Governance in the European Union: Towards a New Architecture (OUP); M 
Dawson (2011) Three Waves of New Governance in the European Union, European Law Review, 36, 
208-226; M Dawson, New Governance And The Transformation Of European Law (CUP 2011).
16 D Hodson and I Maher, The Transformation of EU Treaty Making (CUP 2018).
17 LB Edelman, C Ugger and HS Erlanger, The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedures 
as Rational Myth (1999) 105 American Journal of Sociology 40654; LB Edelman and MC Suchman, 
When the Haves Hold Court: Speculations on the Organizational Internalization of Law (1999) 33 
Law and Society Review 941; L Edelman, Overlapping Field and Constructed Legalities: The 
Endogeneity of Law in J OBrien (ed), Private Equity, Corporate Governance, and the Dynamics of 
Capital Market Regulation (World Scientific, 2007); W Heydebrand, Globalisation and the Rise of 
Procedural Informalism in American and European Law, in V Gessner and D Nelken, European Ways 
of Law: Towards a European Sociology of Law (Hart, 2007).
18 R Mnookin and L Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce (1979) 
88 Yale Law Journal 95097.
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7
particularly through the mechanism of metaphor.20  Work in this vein is in its 
infancy in EU law.21 It has much to offer those, like us, who seek to strike a balance 
between both the over- and under-statement of the importance of law, and to apply 
those insights to particular domains of policy and practice, here health. But its 
methods do rely on the existence of legal texts, so we are unable to contribute to it 
in this article.
TWO POST-BREXIT FUTURES FOR HEALTH LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE IN 
THE UK
As we write in July and early August 2018, there is no agreed legal text between the 
EU-27 and the UK on the terms of the UKs withdrawal from the EU. There is 
political agreement on a draft treaty between the EU and the UK (called the 
Withdrawal Agreement),22 but the principle that nothing is agreed until everything 
is agreed is a central part of the European Commissions negotiating mandate,23 and 
has been stressed at every stage of the negotiations so far. Far from being an agreed 
legal text, there is not even political agreement on a future EU-UK relationship or set 
of relationships, either within the UK government,24 or between the EU and the 
UK.25 
There is existing EU law on the position of third countries in EU law, concerning 
products seeking to enter the EUs single market from such third countries;26 and 
19 See, e.g. H Ross, Settled Out of Court: The Social Process of Insurance Claims and Adjustment (New 
York: Aldine Publishing, 1970); O Fiss, Against Settlement (1984) 93 Yale Law Journal 1073; M 
Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What we know and dont know (and think we know) 
about our allegedly contentious and litigious society (1983) 31 University of California Los Angeles 
Law Review 471; B Bercusson, Maastricht: A fundamental change in European Labour Law (1996) 
23 Industrial Relations Journal 17790; RH Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-
Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO (2002) 56 International Organization 339374; G 
Subramanian, Bargaining in the Shadow of Takeover Defenses (2003) 113 Yale Law Journal 62186; 
S Macaulay, Freedom from Contract: Solutions in Search of a Problem (2004) Wisconsin Law Review 
777820; D Campbell, The Relational Constitution of Remedy: Co-operation as the Implicit Second 
Principle of Remedies for Breach of Contract (2005) 11 Texas Wesleyan Law Review 45580; EU 
Petersmann, Reforming the World Trading System: Rule-Making, Trade Negotiations, and Dispute 
Settlement (OUP, 2005); L T Alexander, Stakeholder Participation in New Governance: Lessons from 
Chicagos Public Housing Reform Experiment (2009) 16 Georgetown Journal on Poverty Law and 
Policy 11785; GC Shaffer, How Business Shapes Law: A Sociolegal Framework (2009) 42 
Connecticut Law Review 14782.
20 A Riles (2005)A New Agenda for the Cultural Study of Law: Taking on the Technicalities, Buffalo 
Law Review 53, 973-1033; M Valverde, Jurisdiction and Scale: Legal Technicalities as Resources for 
Theory (2009) 18 Social and Legal Studies 139; A Riles (2011) Collateral Knowledge: Legal Reasoning 
in the Global Financial Markets (University of Chicago Press); D Cowan, C Hunter, H Pawson, (2012) 
Jurisdiction and scale: rent arrears, social housing and human rights, Journal of Law and Society, 39, 
269-295; D Cowan and D Wincott, (eds), Exploring the Legal in Social Legal Studies (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2016); D Gurnham, (ed), Laws metaphor 43 Journal of Law and Society (2016); M Hanne 
and R Weisberg, (eds) Narrative and Metaphor in the Law (CUP 2018).
21 See A Cohen, and A Vauchez, (2011) The Social Construction of Law: The European Court of Justice 
and Its Legal Revolution Revisited, Annual Review of Law and Society, 7, 417-431; P Craig, (2013) 
Pringle and Use of EU Institutions Outside the EU Legal Framework: Foundations, Procedure and 
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8
people from outside the EU seeking to work, provide and receive services in, and to 
visit EU countries.27 There is existing UK law on the position of people who are not 
EU nationals.28 There is newly adopted UK law on the constitutional position of EU 
law in the UKs legal system immediately post-Exit Day in the form of the EU 
(Withdrawal) Act 2018. There is some UK law in the pipeline. The Taxation (Cross 
Border Trade) Bill (Customs Bill) is in the House of Lords and the Trade Bill has 
completed its third reading in the House of Commons. An Immigration Bill is 
promised for autumn 2018. A Withdrawal Agreement and Implementation Bill has 
also been promised to implement the major elements of the Withdrawal Agreement.
As we still do not have any agreed legal texts, either on the Withdrawal Agreement, 
or on the future EU-UK relationship(s), we can answer only a few questions about 
the legal relationships in post-Brexit health policy and practice (post-Brexit health 
law). What we can do, however, is set out the questions that will need to be 
answered once we have the legal text. We do this below, and where feasible, we also 
indicate what the answers might be if certain possible futures are encapsulated in 
legal text. 
Substance, European Constitutional Law Review, 9, 263-284; PJ Cardwell and T Hervey, The roles of 
law in a new intergovernmentalist EU in C Bickerton, D Hodson and U Puetter, The New 
Intergovernmentalism: States and Supra-National Actors in the Post-Maastricht Era (OUP 2015) 73-
89; PJ Cardwell and T Hervey, Bringing the Technical into the Socio-Legal: The Metaphors of Law and 
Legal Scholarship of a Twenty-First Century European Union in D Cowan and D Wincott, eds, 
Exploring the Legal in Socio-Legal Studies (Palgrave Macmillan 2016) 157-182.
22 Draft Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community highlighting the progress 
made (coloured version) in the negotiation round with the UK of 1619 March 2018, TF50 (2018) 35 
 Commission to EU27. 
23 European Council (Art.50) guidelines for Brexit negotiations, 29 April 2017, P.3, 1. (2) Core 
principles. 
24 See White Paper: HM Government, The Future Relationship Between the United Kingdom and The 
European Union (July 2018). This remains a source of much disagreement across parties and within 
the Conservative party itself.  The EU has not yet formally responded but has indicated that many of 
the proposals will be unworkable.  See DM Herszenhorn and M De La Baume, Barnier Dismantles 
UKs Brexit White Paper Politico (2018) https://www.politico.eu/article/michel-barnier-brexit-
white-paper-analysis/ accessed 1 September 2018.
25 See Steps of doom slide presented by Michel Barnier, European Commission Chief Negotiator to 
the Heads of State and Government at the European Council (Article 50) on 15 December 2017: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/slide_presented_by_barnier_at_euco_15-
12-2017.pdf and the mismatch with the proposals in the July 2018 White Paper which continues to 
maintain UK red lines of an independent trade policy, regulatory autonomy and no free movement, 
all of which would result in a No deal response from the EU.
26 For instance, consumer products, medicines and food sold in the EU must meet safety standards.
27 See for example, blogs: D Acosta, The Security Of The Status Of Long-Term Non-EU Residents In 
The EU: Some Thoughts On Case C-636/16 Lopez Pastuzano 
http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2017/12/the-security-of-status-of-long-term-non.html  accessed 
1 September 2018;
Steve Peers, 'UK Citizens In The EU After Brexit: Securing Unilateral Guarantees After A 'No Deal' 
Brexit'  http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2018/07/uk-citizens-in-eu-after-brexit-securing.html  
accessed 1 September 2018. 
28 Immigration Act 2016. 
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9
We consider the most important legal questions which arise in four separate 
categories of UK health policy and practice relating to: people (healthcare 
professionals and patients); medicines, medical devices and substances of human 
origin; public health; and the devolved jurisdictions. We are not claiming to be 
exhaustive, but to illustrate the most significant issues. 
For the purpose of this article, we model two futures for post-Brexit health law: a 
Former Member State Special Relationship; and No Withdrawal Agreement.  The 
latter is the no deal scenario if negotiations break down.  At the time we write, 
these are the only two options on the table.  (Further options might be no Brexit at 
all, or a further extension of the transition period.  Both have been ruled out by the 
May government and would in any case require EU agreement.)
To model a Former Member State Special Relationship, we draw on the May 
governments July 2018 White Paper,29 as this indicates the UKs negotiating 
position at this time, albeit that the terms have been heavily criticised by both 
Remainers and Leavers, and led to the resignation of senior ministers David Davis 
and Boris Johnson.  For its part, the EU negotiating team led by Michel Barnier has 
indicated that many points in th  White Paper will be unacceptable.  In an article of 
this length we have been unable to consider rules under EEA and EFTA, or the 
existing EU-Switzerland arrangements.  Where there is enacted law (existing EU law 
on the status of third countries; the UKs EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018), we analyse 
its effects. Where text has been agreed in principle (parts of the Withdrawal 
Agreement), we consider what the effects would be if that text became legally 
binding.
The second possible future we consider is where no Withdrawal Agreement 
between the EU and UK is agreed.  In this case, the proposed 2019-2020 transition 
period would not take place.  In the absence of any other arrangements being agreed, 
the UK-EU relationship would fall back on WTO arrangements with regard to 
products and services.  As so few countries in the world trade on that basis alone, it 
is extremely difficult to discern the effects on health policy and practice. UK citizens 
in the EU would be treated as third party nationals under applicable EU law.  EU 
citizens in the UK would fall under UK domestic immigration law.  
With either scenario, the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018 will secure continuity of 
application of existing EU law within the UK, as retained EU law.  What differs  
significantly  between the scenarios is the effect of law on relations between actors 
in the EU-27 and those in the UK.
PEOPLE (PROFESSIONALS, PATIENTS)
29 HM Government, The Future Relationship Between the United Kingdom and The European Union 
(July 2018). 
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10
RETENTION/RECRUITMENT OF HEALTHCARE WORKERS FROM R-EU COUNTRIES
Background
Large numbers of staff from EU-27 countries currently work in the UK NHS and in 
social care.  The most recently available figures30 showed that 61,974 EU-27 
national staff are working in the NHS.31  There is particularly high reliance on these 
staff in London where they represent 12% of the total32.  In September 2017, around 
90,000 EU-27 staff were working in social care33 in the UK, with rural areas being 
highly dependent on these staff to meet demand. In many areas, posts remain 
unfilled.
Stated government policy is for the UK to become self-sufficient in clinical staff and 
additional training places have been created.  However, such self-sufficiency is 
unlikely to be achieved for at least 10-12 years34, if ever:
The requirement for the UK to maintain an immigration system which 
facilitates swift entry to the UK for the health and social care workforce is 
likely to continue for many years, despite the Governments increased 
investment in medical training and the expansion of nurse training posts.  
This is a particularly acute concern in adult social care where some parts 
of the country are highly dependent on EU migrants.35
There are serious concerns that Brexit will lead to a failure to retain, and inability to 
recruit, sufficient clinical staff and social care workers.  The former are needed not 
just to meet hospital and community health staffing needs, but also because highly 
skilled professionals with global expertise and experience will strengthen the 
quality of the service provided.  Care workers may be lower paid and less qualified 
but they have a high social value, and an increasingly ageing population means that 
need will continue to increase.  Nursing, but not care work, is on the shortage 
occupation list of the Migrant Advisory Committee.36  If Brexit leads to large 
numbers of elderly UK pensioners returning to live in the UK, this is likely to put 
further strain on NHS and social care staffing needs.
30 NHS Digital, NHS Workforce Statistics, September 2017, Provisional Statistics (NHS Digital 2017) 
https://digital.nhs.uk/data-and-information/publications/statistical/nhs-workforce-statistics/nhs-
workforce-statistics-september-2017-provisional-statistics accessed 2 September 2018. 
31 C Baker, NHS staff from overseas: statistics, (HC Briefing Paper Number 7783, 7 February 2018) 6.
32 C Baker, NHS staff from overseas: statistics, (HC Briefing Paper Number 7783, 7 February 2018) 4.
33 HC Health Committee Brexit and social care  people & process, 8th Report [Session 2016-17] para 
28.
34 HC Health Committee, Brexit and social care  people & process, 8th Report [Session 2016-17) 
para 54.
35 HC Health Committee, Brexit and social care  people & process, 8th Report [Session 2016-17] 
para 61.
36 The Migrant Advisory Committee is an independent, non-statutory, non-time limited, non- 
departmental public body that advises the government on migration issues. It is sponsored by the 
Home Office: https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/migration-advisory-committee. 
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11
A further concern is the impact of Brexit on research scientists. Here there is of 
course an overlap between highly specialist clinical care and biomedical research.  
The UK currently enjoys a global reputation as a leader in scientific research.  The 
UK has received significant research funding from the EU, including from the 
Horizon 2020 programme, with the UK having received 15% of all funding to date, 
totalling around 4 billion.37  Unless specifically agreed, the UK will no longer be 
eligible for such funding, and its potential to collaborate on major research projects 
will be limited.  There are considerable concerns about the adverse impact on the 
UKs reputation, the financial loss to UK research institutions, and the fear that there 
will be an exodus of leading research scientists from the UK.
Issues and Legal Questions - Some Answers but Many Legal Uncertainties
The principal issues concerning people arise from uncertainty over rights of health 
and social care professionals and workers from the EU-27, and their families, to 
enter the UK, to continue to reside in the UK, and to enjoy associated rights such as 
owning property, transferring pensions or capital, accessing education and housing.  
It is difficult to quantify or predict the effects of a change in status from EU citizen 
to third country national, particularly where these are affect-based, rather than 
derived from the content of rights. There have been numerous reports that EU-27 
nationals in the UK feel undervalued, and a consequent fall in morale of those health 
and social care workers.
The emerging legal landscape has exacerbated these feelings.  This includes the 
bureaucratic processes entailed in applying for permanent UK residency.38 
The existing immigration system is characterised by bureaucratic and 
financial barriers to recruitment from outside the EU which do not 
currently exist for those from inside the EU.  If such a system was extended 
to R-EU after Brexit it would create serious problems for the health and 
care sector.39 
It also includes the much-miscommunicated requirement for Comprehensive 
Sickness Insurance for non-economically active EU migrants, which affects spouses 
or partners of healthcare workers (potentially up to 1 million people40) and is a 
37 Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, UK Participation in Horizon 2020 (HM 
Government 2018). 
38 Eligibility for permanent residence requires proof of residence in the UK for 5 years, and the 
applicant usually needs to be either working or financially self-sufficient.  An applicant will be 
ineligible if they are financially dependent on a family member, or financially responsible for any 
other family members.  A new criterion of settled status will be introduced in March 2019: 
https://www.gov.uk/uk-residence-eu-citizens, accessed 2 August 2018.
39 HC Health Committee, Brexit and social care  people & process. 8th Report [Session 2016-17] 
para 66.
40 HC Health Committee, Brexit and social care  people & process. 8th Report [Session 2016-17] 
para 49.
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leading cause of rejection of permanent residency; and uncertainty over continued 
recognition of foreign professional qualifications. Uncertainty about research 
funding has led to concerns about an exodus of leading research scientists, including 
in biomedicine.
Key legal questions that arise are: What will be the rights of EU-27 and EEA 
nationals already in the UK after May 2019? Will health and social care workers be 
treated differently in terms of migration status to workers in other sectors?  If so, 
how? Will health and social care workers from EU-27 countries or EEA countries be 
treated differently to such workers from outside the EEA?  If so, how? The basis of 
the migration rights of current health and social care workers from EEA countries, 
and their families, will change after May 2019, but will the content of those rights 
remain the same or similar?  
Given that highly skilled specialists from EEA countries can have a beneficial impact 
on the quality of UK healthcare, how will they be encouraged to work in the UK? As 
social care workers are not on the shortage occupation list in UK migration law, how 
will they be recruited in sufficient numbers for current needs  whether from the UK 
or from other countries? Given the current, and likely future, increased shortfall in 
clinical staff, are there any plans to change the law to incentivise expansion of 
training places? Similarly, are there plans to change the law to avoid an exodus of 
leading biomedical research scientists from the UK, given the future impact of 
reduced research funding?
Many of these questions are matters of UK immigration law, and to date, no post-
Brexit Immigration Bill has been presented.  Publication of an immigration White 
Paper has been delayed several times and is now promised for the end of 2018, with 
an Immigration Bill in early 2019 to set rules which will come into force in 2021.41 
The rights of EU-27 and EEA nationals in the UK post-March 2019 is of course 
unilaterally in the control of the UK government and legislature, but to date no 
unilateral guarantees have been given. Rather, the position of those people has been 
conceptualised as a bi-lateral matter, of reciprocity, leading to claims that human 
beings are being used as bargaining chips in the Brexit negotiations.42
Former Member State Special Relationship 
41 HC 434 Oral evidence given by Rt Hon Amber Rudd MP, Home Secretary to the Affairs Select 
Committee, 28 March 2018.
42 See for example, J Quint, 'I will not be used as a bargaining chip in the Brexit negotiations' 
Independent (2 March 2017) https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/letters/brexit-house-of-lords-
theresa-may-brexit-bill-eu-nationals-a7608061.html accessed 3 September 2018; 
T Bueltman, The Tories tell us the rights of EU citizens are now secure. Its a lie The Guardian (8 
December 2017) https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/dec/08/eu-citizens-rights-
brexit-bargaining-chips accessed 3 September 2018;
T Colson,  British citizens living in Europe will lose key freedoms and rights next year Business 
Insider UK (6 June 2018) http://uk.businessinsider.com/britons-living-in-europe-fear-losing-rights-
during-brexit-withdrawal-2018-6 accessed 3 September 2018.
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The status of EU workers in the UK and vice versa, post-Brexit, is a particular cause 
of anxiety for these citizens. The concerns are partly answered in the Joint Reports 
of the phase 1 negotiations,43 although of course these have not (yet) resulted in an 
agreed legal text. If the Withdrawal Agreement is agreed on these terms, citizens 
and their families who are legally residing in either region before the end of the 
transition period will be entitled to continue to do so, during the transition period, 
which ends at the end of December 2020.44 The basis of their rights during that time 
will be the Withdrawal Agreement, and its implementation in national/EU law, 
rather than EU law itself, with all that entails for the enforceability of rights. The 
negotiators are yet to reach agreement on dispute settlement.45 Thus, it is not clear 
whether the Withdrawal Agreement will preserve the current direct and indirect 
effect of rights under it in the UK. International agreements occasionally have direct 
effect in EU law, and are a point of interpretative consistency.46 The EU 
(Withdrawal) Act suggests that direct effect will no longer apply to retained EU law, 
but it is not explicit on the constitutional status of the EU-UK Withdrawal 
Agreement in UK law. Another Act, required by the EU (Withdrawal) Act,47 but as 
yet not available even as a White Paper, is expected to deal with that matter. In 
general, international treaties are not directly enforceable in UK law, although when 
courts interpret domestic legislation they presume that Parliament intends to 
comply with the UKs international obligations.48
The status of health and social care workers from EU-27 and EEA countries in the 
UK after 2020 is even less clear. The EUs negotiating position is that the single 
market is indivisible, and so free movement of people would need to be guaranteed 
by the UK in any future relationship that sought free movement of products and 
services.  The EU has also so far held firm that there will be no sector by sector 
43 European Commission and the United Kingdom Government, Joint Report from the Negotiators Of 
The European Union And The United Kingdom Government on progress during Phase 1 of 
negotiations under Article 50 TEU on the United Kingdom's orderly withdrawal from the European 
Union (European Commission 8 December 2017);  European Union and the United Kingdom, Joint 
Statement from the negotiators of the European Union and the United Kingdom Government on 
progress of negotiations under Article 50 TEU on the United Kingdom's orderly withdrawal from the 
European Union (19 June 2018).
44 HM Government, 'The Future Relationship Between the United Kingdom and The European Union' 
(July 2018) p 32.
45European Union and the United Kingdom, 'Joint Statement from the negotiators of the European 
Union and the United Kingdom Government on progress of negotiations under Article 50 TEU on the 
United Kingdom's orderly withdrawal from the European Union' (19 June 2018). 
46 For discussion see, e.g. P Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law (OUP 2011); PJ Kuijper and others, 
The Law Of EU External Relations: cases, materials, and commentary on the EU as an international legal 
actor (OUP 2013).
47 See EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018, section 7(2), which requires a further Act to bring into effect the 
EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement, if successfully negotiated.
48 For example, Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] 2 AC 557.
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agreements.49 But human migration appears to be a red line for the UK. The May 
government has stated: 
Any future mobility arrangements will be consistent with the ending of free 
movement, respecting the UKs control of its borders and the Governments 
objective to control and reduce net migrationthe UK will make a 
sovereign choice in a defined number of areas to seek reciprocal mobility 
arrangements with the EU, building on current WTO GATS 
commitments50
The UK will also discuss how to facilitate temporary mobility of scientists 
and researchers, self-employed professionals, employees providing services, 
as well as investors.51 
Barniers steps of doom slide52 suggests that, because of the May governments red 
lines, the best the UK can hope for in terms of a future relationship with the EU is 
one modelled on a free trade agreement such as the EU-Canada agreement, which 
has extremely limited elements of human migration.53 The UK has conceptualised 
matters differently, seeking, as a former Member State, to have a relationship with 
the EU that is different from any other state, embracing some elements of 
reciprocity but ending free movement of people.  The UKs approach is thus 
politically challenging, to say the least.
No Withdrawal Agreement
If there is no Withdrawal Agreement, UK domestic law will apply to EU-27 and EEA 
nationals in the UK.  The May government has said that it is keen to continue to 
attract skilled workers from overseas, and it will need to do so to meet NHS and 
social care staffing requirements.  But until the promised post-Brexit Immigration 
Bill is presented, it is deeply unclear how the government will reconcile the 
49 European Council of the European Union, European Council (Art.50) Guidelines for Brexit 
negotiations (2017) http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/04/29/euco-
brexit-guidelines/ accessed 3 September 2018. 
50 HM Government, The Future Relationship Between the United Kingdom and The European Union 
(July 2018) section 1.4.2 Future mobility arrangements, para 76.
51 HM Government, 'The Future Relationship Between the United Kingdom and The European Union' 
(July 2018) section 1.4.2 Future mobility arrangements, Business and services, para 81
52 See Steps of doom slide presented by Michel Barnier, European Commission Chief Negotiator to 
the Heads of State and Government at the European Council (Article 50) on 15 December 2017: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/slide_presented_by_barnier_at_euco_15-
12-2017.pdf.
53 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, Chapter 10: Temporary entry and stay of natural 
persons for business purposes.  This facilitates entry for certain business persons who are citizens of 
Canada and EU member states by removing the requirement for Labour Market Impact Assessments.  
The categories of visitors may be Key personnel; Contractual service suppliers and independent 
professionals; or Short-term business visitors: https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-
citizenship/corporate/publications-manuals/operational-bulletins-manuals/temporary-
residents/foreign-workers/international-free-trade-agreements/canada-eu.html. 
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competing political demands of reducing immigration and ending free movement of 
people, yet also retaining and recruiting not only skilled healthcare workers, but 
also less qualified but socially valuable care workers. 
MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN QUALIFICATIONS
Background
The regulation of medical professionals is covered by the Mutual Regulation of 
Professional Qualifications (MRPQ) Directive 2005/36/EC which provides for 
automatic recognition of the formal qualifications of specified health professionals, 
such as doctors, midwives and nurses.54  These professionals do not need to show 
any other proof of fitness, apart from linguistic ability, in order to practise their 
profession in another EU Member State.  Other medical professionals, such as 
physiotherapists, are also covered under a different part of the Directive, which 
requires mutual recognition of equivalent qualifications.
The General Medical Council and Nursing and Midwifery Council see Brexit as an 
opportunity to introduce a common assessment of competency testing (to include 
testing of doctors, nurses and midwives trained in the UK).55  But they also warn 
against future non-alignment with EU standards. The Royal College of Nursing has 
warned that the MRPQ Directive includes language checks and a duty to inform 
other health regulators about suspended or banned professionals: 
We are concerned that a potential disassociation from these jointly 
developed standards could lead to a loss of safeguards, loss of access to 
alert mechanisms, and other exchange between regulators and potentially 
much slower recognition mechanisms for both inward and outward 
mobility.56
Here, the Brexit process is taking place alongside a consultation on domestic law 
reform on health professional regulation.57 Thus Brexit could be used to circumvent 
54 Doctor, specialised doctor, nurse, dental practitioner, specialised dental practitioner, pharmacist, 
midwife: TK Hervey and JV McHale, European Union Health Law (CUP 2015)142-143.
55 HC Health Committee, Brexit and social care  people & process. 8th Report [Session 2016-17] 
paras 72-75 
56 HC Health Committee, Brexit and social care  people & process. 8th Report [Session 2016-17] 
para 78.
57 See consultation paper: Department of Health, Promoting Professionalism, Reforming Regulation. 
(2017) and responses from the RCN: Royal College Of Nursing Response To The Department Of Health 
And Social Care Consultation Promoting Professionalism, Reforming Regulation (RCN 2018) 
https://www.rcn.org.uk/-/Media/Royal...Of.../Consultation-Responses/.../Conr-5217.Pdf; and AHCS: 
JS Stevens, Chair, AHCS Board; P Le Rolland, Chair, AHCS Regulation Council and B Cooper, President 
to UK Healthcare Professional Regulatory Reform Team, Department of Health, Consultation 
Promoting Professionalism, Reforming Regulation. The Response from the Academy for Healthcare 
Science (23 January,2018).
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normal law reform processes. The House of Commons Health Committee has 
advised that:
The Government is considering new primary legislation to reform the 
professional regulation of health and social care and this should be the 
vehicle to reform the implementation of the MRPQ directive in UK law.  It 
should not be amended using delegated legislation under provisions 
granted by the Great Repeal Bill  it would not be in the interests of 
patients to lose access to the alert mechanisms which identify potentially 
dangerous practitioners and which exist as a central part of EU law on 
mutual recognition of qualifications.58
Issues and Legal Questions - Some Legal Answers but Many Legal Uncertainties
Post-Brexit, the UK will continue to need to ensure consistently high professional 
standards of both UK and non-UK trained health professionals in order to protect 
patient safety, and also avoid harm to the public purse if standards are not met and 
expensive settlements ensue.  There have been suggestions that the UK could 
benefit from departing from EU standards under the MRPQ Directive, but these do 
not take account of the UKs ne d to continue to recruit health care professionals 
from outside the UK. Ideally, to meet those needs and protect patient safety, the UK 
would continue to have access to alert mechanisms through which EU Member 
States share information about potentially dangerous practitioners.  Furthermore, if 
the UK is to continue as a place that is attractive to build a bio-medical professional 
career, there will be a need to ensure that UK health qualifications continue to be 
recognised in other countries.
Will UK legislation remain aligned with EU law on medical qualifications? If not, will 
changes be made by primary or delegated legislation? What will they entail? Which 
medical professionals will be affected and how? As the UK will continue to employ 
medical professionals from EU-27 and EEA countries for the foreseeable future, 
what alert mechanisms, if any, will be in place to secure patient safety? What, if any, 
bilateral arrangements will be agreed with the EU to ensure continuing and future 
recognition of medical qualifications of UK-qualified health professionals working in 
the EU and vice versa?
Former Member State Special Relationship
If the Withdrawal Agreement is agreed, this will secure continued mutual 
recognition of qualifications for the duration of the transitional period, unless or 
until the UK changes those rules with which the UK currently complies in setting out 
the bases for qualification as a health professional in the UK.  The points made above 
58 HC Health Committee, Brexit and social care  people & process. 8th Report [Session 2016-17] 
paras 83-84.
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about the lack of clarity or enforceability of the Withdrawal Agreement also apply 
here, obviously.
The issue of mutual recognition of professional qualifications into the future is also 
addressed in section 1.3.2 of the July 2018 White Paper. The May government seeks 
a future partnership with the EU that includes ambitious provisions for the 
recognition of professional qualifications. The UK proposal is for a system that 
is predictable and proportionate, enabling professionals to demonstrate 
that they meet the necessary requirements, or to undertake legitimate 
compensatory measures where there is a significant difference between 
qualifications or training, in a timely way; and
provides transparency, with cooperation between regulators to facilitate 
the exchanges of information about breaches of professional standards, 
and to review changes to professional qualifications over time.
This suggests that post-Brexit the May government does intend to introduce a new 
system of competency testing for health professionals, and a concern that the UK 
should continue to be part of alert mechanisms.  However, the White Paper provides 
no specifics on the professional standards that would be required or the professions 
affected. While rejecting the legal rules securing mutual recognition under EU law, 
and under EEA law, the White Paper simultaneously stresses that the new system 
should not be constrained by existing FTA precedents which only seek to have 
processes for specific negotiated recognition agreements of third country 
professionals, but which do not provide for mutual recognition, and the 
enforceability of EU law and EEA law.
If the competency standards of multiple professions are to be reviewed and mutual 
recognition agreements negotiated separately, this could take a considerable time to 
be resolved, especially if all key stakeholders are involved, including the professions 
and patient groups/NGOs, as well as the general public.  In the meantime, for EU-27 
nationals in the UK, the EU (Withdrawal) Act provides the basis of rights as retained 
EU law. But post-2020 the legal position of UK health professionals seeking 
recognition of their qualifications to work in the EU-27 will remain unclear until it is 
specified in the legal texts pertaining to the future EU-UK relationship(s).
No Withdrawal Agreement
If no Withdrawal Agreement is agreed, UK nationals in EU-27 countries will no 
longer be nationals of an EU Member State or hold a qualification from an EU 
Member State, so will no longer have rights under the MRPQ Directive in EU law. 
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They will be considered to be third country nationals and covered by domestic law 
in each EU-27 Member State.59
The EU (Withdrawal) Act will mean continuity of recognition of professional 
qualifications from EU-27 countries in the UK, unless and until the UK domestic law 
changes.  It is unclear for how long the UK might continue to follow the MRPQ 
Directive, given that it has already stated an intention to deviate from these terms.  
Without a negotiated agreement, the UK would obviously no longer be part of the 
alert mechanisms on professionals whose practices raise concern for patient safety. 
WORKING CONDITIONS
Background
Working conditions in the NHS must comply with the European Working Time 
Directive (EWTD), which seeks to restrict working time hours, but includes many 
opt-outs, several of which are the result of amendments to the EWTD in which UK 
governments have played a key role. The application of EU working time rules in 
clinical contexts remains controversial in several EU countries, including the UK, 
where some feel it places unnecessary constraints on junior doctors training. Junior 
doctors themselves, however, negotiated the rules as part of their contracts.60 
The House of Commons Health Committee sees an opportunity post-Brexit to 
improve matters, including a range of stakeholders in the process: 
The profession should advise how the junior doctors contract could be 
adapted to improve training, team working and flexibility.  The 
Government should then work with the profession to achieve the 
legislative and contractual changes which Brexit might enable.61
Issues and Legal Questions - Few Legal Answers
Will the UK amend working time rules post-Brexit, across the board, or for health 
professions only? If so, what will the new rules provide? Will the process lawfully 
involve delegated legislation under the enabling powers in the EU (Withdrawal) Act 
2018, or will new primary legislation be needed? Or will the future EU-UK 
relationship require regulatory alignment on matters of working time?
In the immediate future, the status of the EWTD will be that of retained EU law in 
the UK. There are questions about how the UK courts will respond to future non-
59 European Commission, Notice to Stakeholders: Withdrawal of the United Kingdom and EU rules in 
the field of regulated professions and the recognition of professional qualifications (21 June 2018).
60 HC Health Committee, Brexit and social care  people & process. 8th Report [Session 2016-17] 
para 89.
61 HC Health Committee, Brexit and social care  people & process. 8th Report [Session 2016-17] 
para 92.
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alignment with EU law which arise from interpretations of the EU directive after 
March 2019. The EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018 is clear that UK courts will no longer be 
obliged to secure the direct effect or supremacy of retained EU law as they are 
currently obliged to do under the European Communities Act 1972. But judicial 
practice may be to secure continued alignment, particularly if the future EU-UK 
relationship (if one is agreed) involves an intention to align.
Beyond that, with no legal texts to analyse, it is impossible to say what the future 
legal position on medical professionals working time will be.
PATIENTS: RECIPROCITY OF CARE
Background
Currently a system of reciprocal healthcare applies between the UK, EU-27 and EEA 
countries by means of the EHIC card, S1 and S2 and the Patients Rights Directive.  
The system, based on the concept that free movement of people within the EU/EEA 
should not result in worsening of their social security entitlements, relies on 
complex set of administrative arrangements, overseen by the European Commission. 
Unless something specific is negotiated, the UK will no longer have access to these 
arrangements after leaving the EU, or, if the Withdrawal Agreement is agreed, after 
the transitional period. The May government has indicated an intention to negotiate 
a reciprocal healthcare arrangement but nothing specific is currently proposed, let 
alone agreed.
Although there is a disparity between amounts paid out by the UK government for 
treating UK citizens in the EU-27 and amounts received from the rest of the EU for 
treating their citizens in the UK, this disparity is largely because of the volume of 
UK-insured pensioners living in the EU-27 (190,000 people) who are in fact treated 
at lower cost to the NHS than if receiving care in the UK.  Nevertheless, the 
government has set targets for greater recovery of costs from other EU 
governments.62 
Issues and Legal Questions - Few Legal Answers
Reciprocal health care post-Brexit has received some political attention but is 
surrounded by significant uncertainty about future access to healthcare for UK 
citizens resident in or visiting EU-27 countries; and for citizens from EU-27 
countries resident in or travelling to the UK. The position of residents has been 
discussed above: here we focus on entitlements of visitors. NGOs such as Kidney 
Care UK have raised issues about post-Brexit inequity for UK citizens who are 
elderly/disabled/chronically ill who wish to travel to R-EU countries but for whom 
62 See Department of Health, Visitor & Migrant NHS Cost Recovery Programme: Implementation Plan 
2014-16 (HM Government 2014) and Department of Health & Social Care, Department of Health 
And Social Care Single Department Plan (HM Government 23 May 2018).
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private health insurance, or private access to kidney dialysis or other treatment 
when visiting an EU-27 country, is unaffordable.
What sort of reciprocal healthcare arrangements will the UK negotiate with the EU, 
and what entitlements will they give to patients? How will they provide immediate 
protection to UK citizens resident in and visiting EU-27 countries on Exit Day? What 
longer term protection, if any, will they offer to UK citizens visiting the EU-27? What 
will be the effects on UK citizens who are elderly/disabled/chronically ill who 
cannot secure private health insurance for travel to EU-27 countries? Given that 
there is insufficient capacity in the NHS to manage a possible large number of 
pensioners returning to the UK post-Brexit, are any legal changes or other 
provisions being made to increase capacity?
If no reciprocal health care arrangements can be negotiated with the EU, will the UK 
enter into bilateral negotiations with each EU country? What legal entitlements will 
each give, and how will they be enforced?
If a reciprocal health care arrangement cannot be negotiated with the EU, will 
citizens of EU-27 countries visiting the UK be treated in the same way as non-
European visitors under the UKs Overseas Visitors Regulations 2017?  That is, 
unless in an exempt category, will they be charged upfront at a 150% tariff for NHS 
care (except in an emergency)63? If so, would that amendment to retained EU law  
which, according to the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018, will continue the current 
entitlements  be made through delegated legislation, or would primary legislation 
be necessary?
It is possible to answer a few of these questions, but only if the Withdrawal 
Agreement is agreed.  Otherwise, significant legal uncertainty continues.
Former Member State Special Relationship 
The UK negotiating position is set out in the July 2018 White Paper, at paragraphs 
84 and 89:
The Government wants UK and EU nationals to continue to be able to use 
the European Health Insurance Card (EHIC) to receive healthcare should 
they need it while on holiday
 There should be reciprocal healthcare cover for state pensioners retiring 
to the EU or the UK, continued participation in the EHIC scheme and 
cooperation on planned medical treatment.  This would be supported by 
any necessary administrative cooperation and data-sharing requirements.
63 The National Health Service (Charges to Overseas Visitors) Regulations 2015, Part 2 (Regulation 
7(3)).
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The points made above about the political difficulties surrounding this position, and 
its incompatibility with the EUs stated negotiating position, apply equally here.
In the short term, if the Withdrawal Agreement is agreed on the terms set out in the 
EU-UK Joint Statement, entitlement to reciprocal healthcare will continue for UK and 
EU citizens who are in each others region/country on Exit day, but only as long as 
that cross-border situation continues.64 
Again in the short term, the UK will maintain the status quo on reciprocity of 
healthcare under the Withdrawal Act 2018, which provides that the relevant EU law 
incorporated in UK domestic law as retained EU law will continue to apply unless 
or until changed by secondary or primary legislation.  EU nationals will retain their 
rights to access health care services if working in the UK or to use the EHIC card as 
visitors, as these rights are currently incorporated in UK Social Security legislation, 
under the UKs obligations as an EU Member State.65  
No Withdrawal Agreement
The UKs Overseas Visitor Charging Regulations, amended in 2017,66 tighten 
residency requirements for entitlement to free NHS care in England.67 In order to 
receive free NHS care, unless within an exempt category, visitors from outside the 
EU must not only be ordinarily resident, but must also have indefinite leave to 
remain.  Without a Withdrawal Agreement, although UK domestic law will continue 
to entitle EU visitors or workers in the UK to healthcare in the short term under the 
EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018, a lack of reciprocity may make it politically expedient for 
the UK government to withdraw this entitlement. This could be effected relatively 
easily by amending the statutory instrument, so that the current Overseas Visitors 
Regulations requirements apply to EU-27 visitors post-Brexit. 
Without a Withdrawal Agreement, UK citizens would be treated as ordinary third 
country nationals (TCNs) in EU law. There are some entitlements in EU law for 
long-term resident TCNs,68 but none of this type for visitors.69  Where the EU does 
64 European Commission and the United Kingdom Government, Joint Report from the negotiators of 
the European Union and the United Kingdom Government on progress during Phase 1 of negotiations 
under Article 50 TEU on the United Kingdoms orderly withdrawal from the European Union 
(European Commission 8 December 2017), para 29.
65 The National Health Service (Charges to Overseas Visitors) Regulations 2015, SI 2015/238, reg 12.  
In the devolved jurisdictions the relevant regulations are the NHS (Charges to Overseas Visitors) 
(Scotland) Regulations 1989; The NHS (Charges to Overseas Visitors) (Wales) Regulations 1989, as 
amended 2007; Provision of Health Services to Persons Not Ordinarily Resident Regulations 
(Northern Ireland) 2015.
66 National Health Service (Charges to Overseas Visitors) (Amendment) Regulations 2017.
67 Different rules apply in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. See HL Select Committee on the 
European Union. Home Affairs Sub-Committee on Brexit: Reciprocal Healthcare. 11 October 2017.  
Oral evidence of Professor McHale, Q20. 
68 Residents would still be entitled to apply for residence under the long-term residents Directive 
2003/109/EC if they had lived in the EU country for at least five years.  If granted, this would provide 
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not have competence, domestic law on access to health care in each EU-27 Member 
State will apply to UK visitors and other residents. In some parts of Spain, for 
instance, it is possible that retired UK nationals may be able to access health care on 
the basis of entitlements in Spanish law.70 The arrangements will be complex, and 
by definition significantly more confusing for individuals than the current situation, 
particularly for UK nationals who move around the EU during their lives.
Moreover, if there is no Withdrawal Agreement, any of the EU-27 countries, or the 
EU itself where it has competence, may decide to withdraw health care rights of UK 
visitors or residents. If this took place, UK visitors to EU-27 countries for work or 
pleasure would need to have private health insurance in place before travel. This 
scenario would cause considerable hardship. It would have a disproportionately 
adverse impact on UK citizens with chronic illness or disability, for whom insurance 
might be unaffordable.  UK citizens resident in the EU for fewer than five years 
would have to make other arrangements, presumably also taking out private 
insurance.  There would be the risk of large numbers of elderly pensioners 
returning to the UK, with resultant additional pressure on the NHS and social care.
In summary, even if the Withdrawal Agreement and future EU-UK relationship is 
successfully agreed and embodied in legal text, and especially if no such agreement 
is reached, the legal uncertainty for people in the context of UK health policy and 
practice is significant. We note the ways in which health care professionals act, 
especially when faced with what they perceive to be medical need, in the context of 
their professional identities. Health professionals do not typically ask questions 
about legal statuses in such situations: they treat patients. We are reminded of a 
study from the 2000s,71 which found boxes of unprocessed E111 forms (the 
precursor to the EHIC) in a Spanish hospital. Legally, the Spanish NHS was entitled 
to be reimbursed for the treatment that had been provided to visitors from other EU 
countries. In practice, that reimbursement would never be claimed. The legal 
position (obligations of other EU Member States to reimburse Spain) did not follow 
social practice (Spain treating patients from other EU Member States for free), not 
least because of insufficient administrative capacity to process the forms. Brexit is 
similar: administrative capacity is severely challenged. We thus suggest that, 
immediately post-Brexit, EU health law is unlikely to be as reliable a predictor of 
social practice as it is as present.
MEDICINES, MEDICAL DEVICES AND SUBSTANCES OF HUMAN ORIGIN 
entitlement to assistance in case of illness, pregnancy, parental assistance and long-term care. See 
Directive Preamble (13) and Article 11. 1(d).
69 Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country 
nationals who are long-term residents.
70 See J Cayon-De Las Cuevas and TK Hervey, A place in the sun? Healthcare rights of retired UK 
citizens in Spain post-Brexit (2017) 12 Health Economics, Policy and Law, pp297-307.
71 M Rosenmoller, M McKee, R Baeten, (eds), Patient Mobility in the European Union: Learning from 
Experience (European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2006), p 68 
http://www.ose.be/files/publication/2006/baeten(Coord)_2006_Patient_Mobility_Book_WHO.pdf. 
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As other papers in this special edition explore in more detail the importance of the 
biomedical life science industry to the UK and the potential impact of Brexit upon it, 
we can be briefer in our analysis here than in the section above.  Many aspects of UK 
health policy and practice here are fundamentally underpinned by EU law, with its 
legislative provisions for pharmaceuticals, medical devices and substances of human 
origin. The NHS is the primary market for such health-related products in the UK. 
The ways in which products reach patients in the UK are constrained by EU law on 
clinical trials,72 marketing authorisations,73 safety standards,74 and the like. Even 
areas of UK health law such as bioethics governance75 or contracting relationships 
within the NHS, that appear to have little to do with EU law, are indirectly affected. 
In addition to EU legislation and soft law on health-related products, general EU 
internal market law governs all transactions across the border between the EU-27 
and the UK. The legal basis of this activity will change post-Brexit. Our aim is to give 
a flavour of the complexity of the legal questions that arise and show the significant 
levels of legal uncertainty.
Background
MEDICINES
Pharmaceuticals may only be traded in the EU if they have a prior marketing 
authorisation, either from a national regulatory authority or from the EU.  The 
overarching regulatory authority for pharmaceuticals is the European Medicines 
Agency (EMA), currently based in London but relocating to Amsterdam in 2019.  
The national UK authority is the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory 
Agency (MHRA).  In 2016 the MHRA took a lead role in 45% of EU regulatory 
procedures76, and on 20%-35% of the EMAs licensing and vigilance work77.  Both 
the EMA and MHRA draw on global standards set by the International Council on 
Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for 
Human Use (ICH).  The MHRA is currently part of the EU delegation to the ICH.  Only 
representatives of EU Member States can act as decision makers in EMA processes, 
or represent the EU in ICH procedures.
72 See in this issue E Cave, EU Clinical Trials Regulation 2014: Fetter or Facilitator and G Laurie, 
How do we make sense of chaos: Navigating health research regulation through the liminality of the 
Brexit process.
73 See in this issue ML Flear, Ensuring post-Brexit UK is a maker rather than a taker of global 
norms and standards: the case of the International Council on Harmonisation.
74 See in this issue JV McHale, Brexit and Medical Devices: a question of legal regulation and patient 
safety.
75 See in this issue J Montgomery, Bioethics after Brexit: Brexit an opportunity to rationalize 
bioethics governance in the United Kingdom.
76 Office for Life Sciences, Life Science Competitiveness Indicators (HM Government April 2017) p 
27.
77 HC Health and Social Care Committee, Brexit: medicines, medical devices and substances of human 
origin. 4th Report [Session 2017-19] para 38.
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In practice, EU marketing authorisations require compliance with EU clinical trials 
legislation and soft law. The current regulatory framework for clinical trials is 
Directive 2001/20/EC.  This had been heavily criticised for being costly and overly-
bureaucratic and it is to be replaced in late 2019 by Clinical Trials Regulation 
536/2014, which provides for a streamlined single EU application for cross-border 
clinical trials.  The UK had a major role in the drafting of this Regulation, which will 
be implemented during the transition period.
EU pharmaceuticals law also includes mechanisms for post-market surveillance 
(pharmacovigilance).  These are coordinated through the EUDRA-VIGILANCE 
system, an electronic system for compulsory exchange of information between 
Member States on unexpected adverse reactions to medicines that have marketing 
authorisations for the EU.
The May government has said that its objective is to ensure that patient access to 
medicines will not be adversely impacted by Brexit.78  The Department of Health 
and Social Care (DHSC) has commissioned Ernst & Young79 to oversee research 
being conducted by DHSC teams on the potential impact of Brexit on the supply 
chain for medicines and medical devices used in the NHS.  The Ernst & Young report 
has not been made public or shared with Parliament, but UK regulatory alignment 
with EU standards is one of the initial concerns identified.80 
There are also issues about pharmaceuticals supply chains. Evidence to the House of 
Commons Health and Social Care Committee suggests that the process of producing 
many pharmaceuticals in common use in the NHS involves components crossing the 
UK-EU-27 border, sometimes multiple times. The industry currently operates on the 
basis of trade across that border based on EU law, and its administrative procedures 
and practices, in particular the electronic paperwork that makes the EUs single 
market in goods a reality.
MEDICAL DEVICES 
Unlike pharmaceuticals, medical devices sold in the EU do not have to have a prior 
marketing authorisation but must show compliance with EU safety standards.  
Products sold in the EUs market which enter or interact with the body must have a 
CE mark certifying conformity.  CE marks are given by a notified body, and five 
such bodies are incorporated in the UK.  EU safety standards draw on global 
guidance set by the International Medical Device Regulators Forum, of which the EU 
is a member, along with Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Japan, Russia, Singapore 
and the US.
78 HC Debate, 28 February 2017, Commons Written Answer.
79 Department of Health and Social Care, 'Brexit: Medicines, Medical Devices and Substances of 
Human Origin: Government Response to the Health and Social Care Committee's Fourth Report of 
Session 2017-19' (HM Government May 2018) p 2, para 2.
80 Other concerns are: Border clearance; Tariffs; Cost of change; Foreign exchange fluctuations; 
Supplier readiness and response; Workforce; Maintaining product quality.
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The robustness of this regulatory approach was brought into sharp relief by the Poly 
Implant Prothèse breast implants scandal, in which it was found that industrial, 
rather than medical, grade silicone had been used in medical devices implanted in 
thousands of women. The EU has amended its medical devices laws since then, and 
the new EU legislation came into force in May 2017,81 though with an 
implementation period until 2020 and 2022 to allow CE certificates granted under 
the previous law to remain valid for two or four years after issue.
As with pharmaceuticals, the EU operates a post-market surveillance system, with 
the EUDRA-MED database, through which Member States exchange information 
about medical devices already on the market, and traceability requirements, linked 
to a new unique device identification database.  A European authorised 
representative must be designated by each medical device manufacturer, who is 
responsible in the event of a future liability claim or breach of the EUs safety 
legislation. It is estimated that around half of such authorised representatives in the 
medical devices industry are based in the UK.82 The UK medical device market is 
significant: third in the EU (after France and Germany) and sixth in the world.83
SUBSTANCES OF HUMAN ORIGIN: BLOOD, PLASMA, ORGANS, TISSUE, CELLS 
The 1980s and 1990s saw many cases of HIV infected blood transfusions in Europe, 
particularly to haemophiliacs, resulting in thousands of deaths.84  This tragedy led to 
the EU Blood Safety Directive 2002 which applies to the collection and testing of 
human blood and blood components. The Directive covers whole human blood and 
red cells, white cells, platelets and plasma.85  EU law provides guidance about safety, 
and prohibits financial gain from blood and other substances of human origin, but 
many matters of regulation of substances of human origin are domestically 
determined, including culturally sensitive rules about opt-in or out of organ 
donation, and rules on consent.
81 Medical Devices Regulation: EU 2017/745 for implementation in 2020 and In Vitro Diagnostic 
Devices Regulation: EU 2017/746 for implementation in 2022.
82 See blog: <https://www.hlregulation.com/2018/02/26/brexit-whats-next-for-medical-devices/> 
accessed 3 September 2018. 
83 See blog: <https://www.emergobyul.com/resources/market-united-kingdom> accessed 3 
September 2018. 
84 See for example: D MacKenzie, New Scientist, 15 January 1994: How safe is Europes blood?: Cases of 
HIV infection in Germany have highlighted the risks of blood transfusion. But better technology may not 
be enough to ensure clean blood supplies across Europe: 
https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg14119082-200/;
Infected Blood Inquiry: <https://www.infectedbloodinquiry.org.uk> accessed 3 September 2018.
85 By contrast, medicinal products involving plasma are covered by the EU pharmaceuticals law. 
Plasma for these products is currently imported from the US, and must comply with EU law. HC 
Heath Committee, Brexit  medicines, medical devices and substances of human origin, HC 392, Oral 
evidence from Liz Carroll, Q64, 5 December 2017.
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The EU takes a precautionary risk approach to blood safety, and its overall 
legislative approach has also been applied to organs, tissues and cells.  A group of EU 
Directives follow a similar model, providing that only duly accredited, authorised or 
licensed national establishments may collect and process substances of human 
origin.86  Competent authorities must be registered, with systems for inspection, 
quality control according to the EUs common criteria for testing of donations to 
ensure quality and safety, and traceability.87  In addition, the EU has actively 
supported Member States to improve their organ donation programmes with the 
main focus being on safe supply and promoting sufficient supply.88  The EU 
Commission Health Directorate General, DG Sante, hosts two rapid alert systems for 
blood and tissues and cells, which allow Member States to communicate with each 
other about serious adverse reactions and events. Furthermore, recognising that the 
use of substances of human origin raises ethical and human rights issues, EU human 
rights law prohibits making the human body and its parts as such a source of 
financial gain.89 The EU is currently conducting a formal evaluation of EU blood, 
tissues and cells legislation.90
These Directives have been transposed into UK law through various pieces of 
secondary legislation.91 NHS Blood and Transplant (NHSBT) is the body responsible 
for overseeing the regulations about blood safety.  Organ donation and 
transplantation, as well as human tissues and cells, are regulated by the Human 
Tissue Authority.  
The UK is not self-sufficient in plasma because of vCJD. NHS BT imports fresh 
plasma from Austria for patients born after 1996.92
Issues and Legal Questions  Few Legal Answers
86 Implementing Directive 2012/25/EU; Directive 2004/23/EC quality and safety for the donation, 
procurement, testing, processing, preservation, storage and distribution of human tissues and cells; 
Organ Transplant Directive 2010/53/EU.
87 For instance, the Single European Code for Tissues and Cells (SEC) was introduced in 2015 to 
ensure traceability of tissues and cells from donor to recipient and vice versa.  The SEC requires 
medical establishments and authorities to apply a unique identifier to every unit of tissues or cells.  
This is supported by a publicly accessible IT platform so that users may access information on the 
origin and specifications of tissues and cells circulating in the EU 
https://ec.europa.eu/health/blood_tissues_organs/overview_en. Accessed 10 August 2018.
88 For example, the EU Action Plan on Organ Donation and Transplantation (2009-2015): 
https://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_threats/human_substance/oc_organs/docs/organs_action_en.pdf.
89 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Article 3 (2) Right to integrity of the person.
90 EC Evaluation of the EU blood and tissues and cells legislation: 
https://ec.europa.eu/health/blood_tissues_organs/policy/evaluation_en. 
91 The Blood Safety and Quality Regulations 2005; the Blood Safety and Quality (Amendment) 
Regulations 2007; Quality and Safety of Organs Intended for Transplantation Regulations 2012; The 
Human Tissue (Quality and Safety for Human Application) (Amendment) Regulations 2018.
92 House of Commons Health and Social Care Committee. Brexit: medicines, medical devices and 
substances of human origin, HC392. Oral evidence from Ian Bateman, Q75, 5 December 2017.
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Similar legal questions arise for medicines, medical devices and substances of 
human origin post-Brexit.  These concern trade rules, regulatory alignment, and 
institutional arrangements.
In the future EU-UK trade relationship, what rules will apply to pharmaceuticals, 
medical devices, and substances of human origin? What tariffs (if any) will apply? 
Will rules having equivalent effect, including, for instance, procurement processes, 
be prohibited? On what basis? On a practical level, what administrative 
arrangements will apply when pharmaceuticals, devices and substances of human 
origin cross the EU-UK border, in either direction? What electronic paperwork will 
be required?
Will the UK secure an agreement involving continued membership of the EMA, for 
instance on a similar basis to Norway, or Switzerland? Will the UK nonetheless align 
with EU regulatory standards, and processes for checking the safety of 
pharmaceuticals, such as batch testing? Will the UK continue to be aligned with EU 
law on data protection? Will the UK seek alignment with the new Clinical Trials 
Regulation? Will it be included as retained EU law within the EU (Withdrawal) Act 
2018? Even if it is, how will practical access to the associated database be regulated?  
Will the UK continue regulatory alignment with the EU on medical devices, and on 
safety and traceability standards for substances of human origin? 
Or will the UK choose to align with another global regulatory block, such as the USs 
FDA? What will be the content of those new laws, and how effective will they be at 
protecting patients, and the NHS as the principal purchaser in the UK? For instance, 
will rules on procurement, or on direct-to-consumer advertising of pharmaceuticals, 
change? 
Will the UK seek membership of the ICH and on what basis? In what ways will the 
law governing the MHRA change to reflect its changed global and national status?
Will the UK seek continued access to the EUs rapid alert systems for blood and 
tissues and cells, for unexpected suspect adverse reactions to pharmaceuticals or 
medical devices?
Will the UK legally prohibit pharmaceutical or medical devices companies from 
using IP rights to prevent imports from EU countries, for instance in the Trade Bill?
MEDICINES
Key issues for pharmaceuticals immediately post-Brexit involve security of supply.  
Some 90% of drugs in the UK are imported, with 45% of those coming from the 
EU.93 Over 80% of radioisotopes are imported from Europe.94 In August 2018 the 
93 House of Commons Health and Social Care Committee. Brexit:medicines, medical devices and 
substances of human origin, HC392. Oral evidence from Martin Sawer, HDA, Q2, 5 December 2017.
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government issued the Medicines Supply Contingency Planning Programme, which 
provides guidance for stockpiling medicines, as a contingency against a failure to 
agree the Withdrawal Agreement.95 Some medicines and health-related products 
have such a short shelf-life that even relatively small delays on a border mean they 
would be useless when they eventually reached their destination. Of course, other 
sources of supply of pharmaceuticals exist, as this is a global industry, and the UK 
pharmaceutical industry could increase its capacity, if the right incentives are 
offered. But all of this will require legal and policy change, and increased costs.
Alignment with EU pharmaceutical regulation, particularly the EMAs standards, 
which draw on EU law such as the Clinical Trials Regulation and Data Protection 
Regulation, will be necessary if the UK is to continue to trade with the EU in 
pharmaceuticals, and to protect the UK pharmaceutical industry from losses 
incurred by losing its principal market. Questions of alignment raise issues of the 
future role of the MHRA, representation of the UK on EU and international 
regulatory bodies, and, critically on a practical level, access for the UK to the Clinical 
Trials Regulations portal and database, as well as EUDRA-VIGILANCE. 
Without regulatory alignment with one of the globally recognised systems, such as 
the EUs or the USs FDA, new drugs typically reach markets around 18 months later 
than in countries that are aligned.96 It may be possible to offer incentives to the 
global pharmaceutical industry to compensate for the otherwise inevitable harm to 
patients in the UK. Current EU law prohibiting the use of intellectual property rights 
to divide up the EU market means that the NHS is able to purchase drugs on the 
market in other EU countries at lower costs than would otherwise apply.97
MEDICAL DEVICES
Similar supply issues arise as for pharmaceuticals.  Approximately 60% of medical 
devices sold in the UK are imported, with 75% of these being imported from EU-27 
countries.98  Of course, other sources are available globally: in 2015, some 20% of 
94 House of Commons Health and Social Care Committee. Brexit:medicines, medical devices and 
substances of human origin. HC392. Oral evidence from Dr Jeanette Dickson, Q19, 5 December 2017.
95 DHSC Medicine Supply Contingency Planning Programme, 23 August 2018. 
https://www.gov.uk/guidance/medicines-supply-contingency-planning-programme.
96 HC Health and Social Care Committee, Brexit: medicines, medical devices and substances of human 
origin. 4th Report [Session 2017-19] para 67.
97 Estimates of savings vary, but Dayan (https://www.nuffieldtrust.org.uk/research/brexit-
relationship-eu-shape-nhs#finding-a-system-that-works-for-medicines) suggests £100million a year 
seems credible, citing P Kavanos, J Costa-i-Font, S Merkur and M Gemmill, The economic impact of 
pharmaceutical parallel trade in European Union Member States: a stakeholder analysis, (LSE Health 
and Social Care, 2004) and U Enemark KM Pedersen and J Sorensen The economic impact of parallel 
import of pharmaceuticals (CAST paper 2006).
98 GlobalData Healthcare. Brexit: impact of no deal on the UK medical devices industry. 29 March 2017 
https://www.medicaldevice-network.com/comment/commentbrexit-impact-of-no-deal-on-the-uk-
medical-devices-industry-5774942/. 
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medical devices in the UK were imported from the USA.99  Issues of capacity building 
arise if the UK is to become more self-sufficient.  There are also questions of patient 
safety, especially if the UK is excluded from EUDRA-MED.  The powers of the UK-
based notification bodies will need to be clarified: depending on the type of Brexit 
negotiated, their decisions may be valid only in the UK post-Brexit.  European 
authorised representatives based in the UK will no longer be recognised in EU law 
unless explicitly agreed in the future EU-UK relationship.  Post-Brexit, the UK will no 
longer be part of, or capable of informing, the EUs delegation to the International 
Medical Device Regulators Forum.
SUBSTANCES OF HUMAN ORIGIN
As with pharmaceuticals and medical devices, the issues that arise concern the 
terms on which the UK continues to import and export substances of human origin 
from and to the EU post-Brexit. There are concerns among patient organisations, 
and the broader health sector, that safety standards for substances of human origin 
should remain high, given the history of regulation in Europe, and the existence of 
different regulatory models elsewhere in the world, particularly in the USA.  Further, 
given that the UK is reliant on EU-27 supplies of plasma for younger patients, there 
will be a particular need to secur  that supply, or find other sources. 
Former Member State Special Relationship 
If the UK secures a Withdrawal Agreement, many short term issues concerning 
continuity of supply of medicines, devices, equipment and substances of human 
origin will be addressed during the transition period. The Joint Negotiating text 
gives details on free movement of products during transition, including the practical 
administrative aspects involved when products cross the EU-27 UK border during 
that time.  The essential aim is to secure continuity of trade in goods until December 
2020. 
Thereafter, the May governments stated intention is to continue to participate in 
the European medicines regulatory network partnership between the EU, EEA and 
the EMA.100  The UK intends to seek associate membership of the EMA and states 
that it will bring domestic legislation into alignment with the Clinical Trials 
Regulation.  In addition, the UK would want to secure access to relevant IT 
systems, and with regard to the EMA, with UK regulators still able to conduct 
technical work, including acting as a leading authority for the assessment of 
medicines, and participating in other activities like ongoing safety monitoring and 
the incoming clinical trials framework.101
99 See https://www.export.gov/article?id=United-Kingdom-Medical-Equipment. 
100 Amended clause to the Trade Bill.  See HC Consideration of Bill (Report Stage): 17 July 2018, p35:  
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2017-
2019/0122/amend/trade_daily_rep_0716.pdf.
101 HM Government, The Future Relationship Between the United Kingdom and The European Union 
(July 2018) Section 1.2.3 Manufactured Goods, para 30.
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The White Paper seeks a UK-EU relationship based on a common rulebook, which 
would mean that products such as medical devices and equipment would only have 
to be tested as conforming with safety rules, good manufacturing guidance and 
quality assurance processes in one market, in order to be sold in either.  This 
mutual recognition approach appears similar to the EUs arrangements with 
Switzerland.  Whether the EU would be prepared to agree to this type of agreement 
will depend on negotiations.  Barniers responses to the White Paper are cautious, 
stressing the indivisibility of the internal markets four freedoms and pointing out 
that regulatory alignment involves not only border controls, but also enforceability 
of EU law, while at the same time hoping for a future partnership between the EU 
and the United Kingdom that is unprecedented in scope and depth.102
The Health and Social Care Committees Fourth Report to the government stressed 
the importance of securing the closest possible regulatory alignment with the 
EU103 in order to ensure continued supply of substances of human origin.  This 
seemed to be accepted by the government in its response:
With regard to substances of human origin, the current regulatory 
framework is well established and sets high quality and safety standards 
for patients in the UK.  The Governments priority is to maintain the same 
high standards after the UK exits the EU.  The current arrangements 
support the free movement of blood, blood components, organs, tissues and 
cells across the EU and continued collaboration and a close relationship 
between the UK and EU would be of great benefit to patients.  
This suggests, without stating explicitly, that the UK government wishes to maintain 
the current EU-derived regulatory framework after the transition period ends in 
2010.  The import and export of blood plasma products could also continue 
unhindered if agreement can be reached.  Any agreement would require the EU to 
formally recognise the acceptability of UK regulatory procedures.  The UK would 
also need to negotiate continued access to the alert systems and the EUs traceability 
platform. 
The comments above about the EUs negotiating position, and Barniers 
interpretation of the implications of the UKs red lines on human migration, apply 
in force here. The UKs position, which seeks to sever one aspect of the EUs internal 
market (products), from others (people, services), appears fundamentally 
incompatible with the EUs position on the integrity of its internal market law.
102 M Barnier An Ambitious Partnership with the UK after Brexit 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/news/ambitious-partnership-uk-after-brexit-2018-aug-02_en. 
103 HC Health and Social Care Committee, Brexit: medicines, medical devices and substances of 
human origin. 4th Report [Session 2017-19] Section 4: Aligning with the EU on market authorisation 
and regulation, para 71.
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No Withdrawal Agreement
Without a Withdrawal Agreement, trade between the EU-27 and the UK in 
pharmaceuticals, medical devices and equipment, as with all products, and also 
substances of human origin,104 would be only on the basis of WTO arrangements. 
Trade with other countries that is currently regulated by EU law because the EU has 
negotiated a free trade agreement with that country, would also be on that basis, as 
the EUs trade agreements with third countries would not automatically become 
bilateral UK-other country agreements. 
It is extremely difficult to discern what this would mean, as so few countries 
currently trade on that basis. Most global trade is on the basis of free trade 
agreements of more or less density, and with different parameters. Although 
pharmaceuticals are zero-rated in terms of tariffs under WTO law, the real issue is 
non-tariff barriers to trade, that is to say the complex network of laws and 
regulatory standards with which producers of (health-related) products must 
comply if they wish to sell on the EUs market. WTO membership does not guarantee 
recognition that such standards have been met, so UK producers would be unable to 
sell to the EU-27 unless the EU decided unilaterally to recognise UK standards, 
perhaps on the basis of previous compliance and the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018. 
Such unilateral action seems highly unlikely, especially given that the EU has 
explicitly stated, in its Brexit preparedness notices that the legal status of the UK 
will be that of a third country in the event of no Withdrawal Agreement.105 
For instance, the European Commissions Notice to Stakeholders. Withdrawal of the 
United Kingdom and EU rules in the field of substances of human origin (blood, tissues 
and cell, and organs) of 23 January 2018 notes that, in the event of no Withdrawal 
Agreement, the UK will become a third country, and the EUs rules will no longer 
apply to the UK.  This means that imports of blood from the UK into the EU-27 will 
need to be tested in conformity with EU requirements (UK testing will not be 
recognised), tissues will need to be imported by authorised establishments in an 
EU-27 state, and organ exchanges will need to be supervised by an EU-27 competent 
authority. Traceability will need to be secured in all cases.  
Where EU law requires a designated European authorised representative, as in the 
case of medical devices and substances of human origin, any such person based in 
104 See the European Commissions Brexit preparedness notices,  available from 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/brexit/brexit-preparedness/preparedness-notices_en, especially 23 
January 2018,  Notice to Stakeholders: Withdrawal of the UK and EU Rules in the Field of Substances of 
Human Origin.
105 See the European Commissions Brexit preparedness notices,  available from 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/brexit/brexit-preparedness/preparedness-notices_en, especially 23 
January 2018, Notice to Marketing Authorisation holders of centrally authorized medicinal products for 
human and veterinary use, and the information on the EMAs website giving detailed advice to private 
parties.
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the UK will cease to be recognised.106  Similarly, UK-based Notified Bodies will 
cease to be recognised as such by the EU and will be removed from the EUs 
database on such organisations.  UK-based Notified Bodies will no longer be able to 
show product conformity with EU legislation on products subject to the CE system. 
107
Some have argued that WTO law imposes some obligations on the EU in the event of 
no Withdrawal Agreement.108 But even if it does, which is disputed,109 those 
companies or other entities seeking to trade health-related products across the EU-
UK border post-Brexit do not have the kinds of rights under WTO law as they do in 
EU law. WTO membership falls woefully short of the procedural and remedial 
aspects of EU law where there has been a breach. Even if WTO law had been 
breached, it would not be possible in practice for a company or NHS entity to 
enforce it to secure movement of health-related products across the border.
The UKs market will continue to recognise EU standards in the short term, because 
these will be embodied in UK law as retained EU law under the EU (Withdrawal) 
Act 2018. Whether that assurance will be sufficient for EU-based traders with whom 
NHS entities in the UK seek to contract is one of the significant legal uncertainties of 
a no Withdrawal Agreement Brexit. Certainly a UK Act of Parliament provides 
significantly less security in the event of, say, contractual litigation, than 
membership of the EU, and hence compliance with EU law.  The underpinning legal 
basis on which cross-border contracts for health-related products are formed, or 
organs are exchanged between entities in the EU and those in the UK, will change 
fundamentally in the event of no Withdrawal Agreement. Whether that changes 
practice and policy is also a huge unknown quantity at the time we write.
Some Leave supporting politicians have suggested that the UK could simply open its 
borders in the event of no Withdrawal Agreement being agreed.110 The detailed 
106 See the European Commissions Brexit preparedness notices,  available from 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/brexit/brexit-preparedness/preparedness-notices_en, especially 22 
January 2018, Notice to Stakeholders: Withdrawal of the UK and EU rules in the field of industrial 
products. 
107 See the European Commissions Brexit preparedness notices,  available from 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/brexit/brexit-preparedness/preparedness-notices_en, especially 22 
January 2018, Notice to Stakeholders: Withdrawal of the UK and EU rules in the field of industrial 
products.
108 P Minford, World Trade Rules Are Nothing To Be Scared Of: UK Will Flourish Without Dead Hand 
Of EU Express (2018) <https://www.express.co.uk/comment/expresscomment/992795/brexit-wto-
world-trade-rules-uk> accessed 3 September 2018. 
109 Full Fact: EU facts behind the claims: trade rules. 25 April 2016: https://fullfact.org/europe/eu-
facts-behind-claims-trade-rules/. 
110 L OCarroll, Rees-Mogg: No Need For Customs Checks At Dover In No-Deal Brexit The Guardian 
(2018) <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/jun/11/rees-mogg-no-need-for-customs-
checks-at-dover-in-no-deal-brexit> accessed 3 September 2018; R Perring, Britains borders 
betrayal: Brexit could see borders flung WIDE OPEN if there's no deal Express (2018) 
<https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/933241/brexit-news-border-customs-union-EU-no-deal> 
accessed 3 September 2018.
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practicalities of this suggestion are yet to be fully understood, or embodied in legal 
text, or administrative procedures. The idea that any products, wherever from, 
could enter the UK without any border controls, in April 2019, seems far-fetched: 
how would consumer/patient protection standards be secured? And if products 
from the EU-27 and/or from countries with which the EU has free trade agreements 
are to be treated differently from those from elsewhere, then some kind of border 
control will be necessary. It has also been suggested that this might breach WTO 
obligations of trade on a basis of non-arbitrary discrimination. The May government 
has indicated111 that they would recognise marketing approvals where given by the 
EU, but there would not be reciprocal approval of medicines or devices developed 
and produced in the UK in the EU-27.
In the absence of specific agreements, post-Brexit, the UK will no longer have access 
to post-market cross-border monitoring and notification schemes for 
pharmaceuticals, devices or substances of human origin. The UK would no longer be 
a member of the EMA or its approval processes.   Without an agreement to the 
contrary, the UK will no longer be part of (or capable of informing) the EUs 
delegation to the ICH112 or to the International Medical Device Regulators Forum. 
Cross-border clinical trials involving the UK and any EU-27 Member State could not 
continue without securing compliance with EU data protection law, as the UK would 
be treated as a third country for compliance purposes.113
Attempts to remain within the clinical trials database would be disrupted, with 
adverse impact on clinical trials, including cross-border clinical trials currently in 
progress. The UK would no longer be part of the global regulatory body, ICH, and 
would need to lobby for membership in its own right.  
Overall, the impact on pharmaceutical research would be immediate and 
adverselarge pharmaceutical companies would have to plan well in 
advancewhich would presumably mean moving some or all of their 
research and development activities. 114
111 HM Government, The Future Relationship Between the United Kingdom and The European Union' 
(July 2018), Section 1.2.3 Manufactured goods, Para 31; HM Government, 'Continuity in the 
availability of goods for the EU and the UK. Position Paper (13 July 2017): 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fil
e/638958/Continuity_in_the_availability_of_goods_for_the_EU_and_the_UK_Position_Paper.pdf. 
112 M Flear, Optimising the UKs Post-Brexit Influence in Global Standards-Setting  Example II: 
Brexit and Medical Devices Regulation, 25.10.17: 
https://markflear.wordpress.com/2017/10/25/optimising-the-uks-post-brexit-influence-in-global-
standards-setting-example-ii-brexit-and-medical-devices-regulation/. 
113 European Commission Directorate-General Justice and Consumers, Notice to Shareholders. 
Withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the Union and EU Rules in the field of Data Protection (9 
January 2018).
114 The UK in a Changing Europe, 'Cost Of No Deal' (2018) 17 <: http://ukandeu.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2017/07/Cost-of-No-Deal.pdf.> accessed 3 September 2018. 
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PUBLIC HEALTH
As matters pertaining to many public health issues, such as environmental controls, 
air and water quality, and risks from chemicals, unsafe products, food, tobacco and 
alcohol essentially involve the same considerations as health-related products, in 
this short section we focus only on aspects of communicable disease control.
Background
Regular global outbreaks such as the pandemic of H1N1 Influenza (Swine Flu) in 
2009-10 and Zika in 2015-16 demonstrate that infectious diseases do not respect 
national borders.  The UK is a member of numerous international organisations 
which work to strengthen global health security115, including against the threat of 
serious communicable diseases with pandemic potential.  It is also a signatory to 
international legal instruments such as the WHOs International Health Regulations 
(2005) (IHR) which set obligations and guidelines for preparedness and response to 
public health emergencies of international concern.  These memberships and 
obligations will be unaffected by the UK leaving the European Union.
In recent years, the EU has been making efforts to ensure that Member States are 
prepared for infectious disease outbreaks.  Key EU legislation is the implementing 
Decision 1082/13 on serious cross border threats to health.  This supports 
compliance with the IHR and also encourages greater coordination between 
Member States.  
The EU has established a number of bodies and systems to strengthen the ability of 
Member States to respond to communicable disease threats.  For example, the UK is 
part of the EUs Health Security Committee, which holds regular meetings to share 
information on health-related threats in Europe.  In 2005 the European Centre for 
Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) was established as an EU agency with 
headquarters in Stockholm.116  The ECDC monitors public health threats in Europe 
from communicable disease and provides risk assessments and other technical 
expertise to Member States.  The ECDC also runs several online surveillance and 
data collection systems117, including the Early Warning Response System (EWRS), 
which notifies Member States of outbreaks and provides for exchange of 
information; the European Surveillance System, a data collection system which 
analyses, aggregates and reports data provided by Member States on communicable 
diseases; the Epidemic Intelligence Information System, which allows nominated 
public health experts to exchange technical information on current and emerging 
health threats; and the Threat Tracking Tool, a database of verified events which is 
115 For example, the Global Health Security Initiative: http://www.ghsi.ca/english/index.asp. 
116 www.ecdc.europa.eu.
117 Faculty of Public Health, The UK and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control 
(ECDC). Blueprint for a Post-Brexit Relationship (FPH June 2018) Section 3. Current relationship 
with ECDC.
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used to assess communicable disease threats.  The ECDC is also a centre for 
international collaboration between communicable disease experts from Member 
States.
In June 2018, the UK Faculty of Public Health (FPH) published The UK and the 
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. Blueprint for a post-Brexit 
relationship, which sets out the benefits provided by the ECDC.  The FPH also 
conducted a poll of UK health protection experts:
Respondents unanimously felt that it was very important (mean score 
9.6/10) to retain a working relationship with ECDC post Brexit to be able 
to respond effectively to cross-border threats and for UK health security  
many felt their ability to manage future outbreaks post-Brexit would be 
weakened if the UK were to move outside of ECDC, mainly due to the loss of 
EWRS and professional collaborative opportunities.
The FPH suggested three possible options for the UKs future relationship with the 
ECDC, in order of preference.  Firstly, and ideally, would be to retain full 
membership status with the ECDC.  The FPH calculated that this would require 
annual contributions of approximately 6 million.  Secondly, the creation of a 
bespoke relationship with ECDC and other international Health Security 
organisations, although this would be a long-term project and would require 
significant investment in system strengthening.  If neither of these options is 
possible, the FPH suggests a bilateral European Neighbourhood Policy Agreement, 
such as the ECDC is currently negotiating with non-EU countries in Northern Africa 
and Eastern Europe.  However this type of agreement is unlikely to go much further 
than basic technical cooperation.118
Additionally, the FPH argued whether the UK is part of ECDC or not, we would urge 
the Government to ensure that the UK remains a member of the Health Security 
Committee and continues to benefit from its coordinated action on cross border 
health threats.
Issues and Legal Questions
Key issues are to ensure that UK health security is not weakened by reduced access 
to European web-based surveillance and data sharing systems; and to maintain the 
UKs access to the ECDC, and its collaborative processes.
The following key legal questions arise: What will be the legal relationship between 
the UK and the ECDC? Will the UK secure full or associate membership? Will the 
relationship include access to the full range of ECDC activities and data, such as the 
118 Faculty of Public Health, The UK and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control 
(ECDC). Blueprint for a Post-Brexit Relationship (FPH June 2018) Section 10 Options for UK-ECDC 
post-Brexit.
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EWRS? What provisions will be made to ensure a coherent response to cross-border 
threats with EU-27 countries once the UK is no longer a member of the Health 
Security Committee?  Will it seek Observer status?
Will the UK remain aligned with Decision 1082/13 on cross-border threats to 
health? Or will amendments to the implementing legislation be made under the EU 
(Withdrawal) Act 2018?
Former Member State Special Relationship 
The UK stated in the July 2018 White Paper that it wishes to maintain close 
collaboration with the ECDC including access to all associated alert systems, 
databases and networks, to allow the UK and the EU Member States to coordinate 
national responses.119  The ECDC does work with EEA/EFTA countries (Norway, 
Iceland and Liechtenstein), but there is no certainty that the ECDC will grant similar 
status to the UK.  The FPH has pointed out that the UK is unlikely to have the 
arrangements around immigration and trade that are currently in existence in other 
partner countries.120 The draft Withdrawal Agreement text does not include any 
provisions about the ECDC.
Nevertheless, an outbreak of serious communicable disease in the UK during the 
transition period, or thereafter, would likely impact on neighbouring European 
countries.  Therefore, for security reasons, if withdrawal terms are agreed with the 
EU, continuation of the current arrangement, i.e. UK membership of the ECDC, the 
Health Security Committee and participation in the various surveillance and data 
sharing systems would be mutually beneficial and might be negotiated, whether 
within the Withdrawal Agreement, the future trade agreement or within another 
agreement altogether. If such matters are interpreted as security, rather than 
trade, it may be feasible to reach agreement that does not breach the EUs stated 
negotiating position for trade agreements, for instance as articulated in the Barnier 
steps of doom slide.  It is unclear whether the UK could be a full member, or would 
have to be an associate, and it would be subject to payment by the UK of appropriate 
financial contributions.  
EU Decision 1082/13 closely follows the requirements of the IHR.121  As a signatory 
to the IHR, the UK will likely remain in alignment with the Decision, although the 
basis for this will be compliance with the UKs international law obligations, rather 
than EU law, unless it is specifically covered in the EU-UK future relationship. This 
may not be a priority for negotiations, especially in the shorter term.  The UKs 
119 HM Government, The Future Relationship Between the United Kingdom and The European Union 
(July 2018) Section 2.5.5 Health security, Para 113a.
120 Faculty of Public Health, The UK and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control 
(ECDC). Blueprint for a Post-Brexit Relationship (FPH June 2018) Section 10 Options for UK-ECDC 
post-Brexit.
121 Decision No 1082/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 on 
serious cross-border threats to health [2013] L 2 293/02.
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ability to achieve greater coordination with neighbouring states may be hindered if 
it is unable to gain access to the same surveillance data and technical advice from 
the ECDC as EU Member States.
No Withdrawal Agreement
If negotiations collapse, as a third country, the UK will immediately lose access to 
all the EU health security bodies and systems from which it currently benefits as an 
EU Member State.  The UK might then seek an alternative arrangement of the type 
suggested by the FPH, i.e. a bespoke arrangement or a basic bilateral agreement, to 
regain some access to EU systems, particularly the ECDC, the EWRS and the Health 
Security Committee.  Either option would require time to negotiate and in the 
meantime, the UKs health security would be left vulnerable with surveillance 
systems disrupted.122
THE DEVOLVED JURISDICTIONS, ESPECIALLY ON THE ISLAND OF IRELAND
Background
Responsibility for public health and the NHS is devolved to the separate 
jurisdictions of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. When the UK leaves 
the EU, powers currently held at EU level will be repatriated, but the question of 
how these competences will be redistributed back to the devolved level remains 
disputed. The UKs constitutional settlement has been described as evolving, and 
certainly the relationships between Westminster and the governments in Cardiff, 
Edinburgh and Stormont are quite different now from when the UK joined the then 
EEC in the 1970s. 
There are reported to be 141 areas of overlap bet een the EUs powers and 
devolved powers in Northern Ireland, 111 in Scotland, and 64 in Wales.123  While 
the majority of policy areas concern the environment and transport, some cover 
health matters, and some are within the domain of the Department of Health.  As 
well as having distinct NHS arrangements, the devolved jurisdictions have 
developed their own laws and policies in areas such as minimum alcohol pricing, 
obesity and tobacco regulation.
122 A Matthews-King, 'No-Deal Brexit Will Be 'Catastrophe' For NHS And Increase Risk From Deadly 
Pandemics, BMA Warns' Independent (2018) <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-
news/brexit-no-deal-nhs-pandemic-bma-final-say-voters-referendum-a8493221.html> accessed 3 
September 2018. 
123 Institute for Government, 'Brexit, devolution and common frameworks' (IFG 2018) 
<https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainers/brexit-devolution-and-common-
frameworks> accessed 3 September 2018. 
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For Northern Ireland, the situation is more complex. Despite different health 
systems in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland there is a high level of 
cross-border integration of those health systems:
unhindered by border checks and supported by reciprocal arrangements 
between healthcare providers in Northern Ireland and the Republic of 
Ireland, an ambulance can travel to wherever is closest and best for any 
particular patient on either side of the border.  Such arrangements would 
be in doubt if a hardening of the customs border between the UK and the 
EU produced restrictions on the movement of pharmaceutical products or 
medical devices, or even medical staff.124
Some health facilities are currently shared, with patients from both Northern 
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.  These include the North Western Cancer Centre 
at Altnagelvin Hospital in Northern Ireland, which serves patients in the western 
part of Northern Ireland and north and west Donegal; and Our Ladys Childrens 
Hospital in Dublin, which provides heart surgery for children across the island of 
Ireland.
The EU has provided funding for a number of health projects in and across the 
devolved jurisdictions.125 For instance, a 7.6 million project on mental health for 
Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland was announced in March 2018, 
supported by the health strand of the EU-funded Cooperation and Working 
Together.126 All of this integration has taken place within the broad parameters of 
the peace process, following the Good Friday Agreement, in which the EU has been 
closely involved. Health care thus plays a (small) role in security, peace and stability 
on the island of Ireland. It is therefore arguably not only a matter of trade. This is 
important in terms of the basis of future EU-UK relationships concerning the island 
of Ireland, which can be conceptualised as part of the EUs external relations 
security competence, not only its trade relations. As noted above, conceptualising 
matters as security rather than trade might give the EU more leeway in its 
negotiating position.
Issues, Legal Questions but few Legal Answers
Key issues here concern restoration of EU level powers to the devolved jurisdictions. 
If each jurisdiction gains significant powers, for instance in public health fields, 
124 M Flear, K Hayward and T Hervey, Brexit, Health And The Devolved Regions And Nations (The 
UK in a Changing Europe 17 March 2018) <http://ukandeu.ac.uk/brexit-health-and-the-devolved-
regions-and-nations/> accessed 3 September 2018. 
125 For example, Interreg:  https://www.seupb.eu/iva-overview and PEACE: 
https://www.seupb.eu/piv-overview. 
126 Belfast Telegraph Digital, 'New 7.6M cross-border project to tackle increase in mental health 
issues' (9 March 2018) <https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/new-76m-
crossborder-project-to-tackle-increase-in-mental-health-issues-36687691.html> accessed 3 
September 2018. 
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regulatory deviations may jeopardise the UKs internal market for products. While 
this may or may not be a problem internally, it will certainly make it more difficult 
for the UK to offer access to the whole of its market when it negotiates trade 
agreements with the EU and/or with other trading blocs or countries.
A loss of EU funding for health projects in the devolved jurisdictions may result in 
possible adverse impact on health indicators.
In Northern Ireland, the challenges of disentangling what is in effect a single health 
workforce and, in some areas, shared patient provision are significant. The legal 
arrangements that underpin the common travel area on the island of Ireland were 
adopted on the basis that both countries were members of the EU.127 The extent to 
which they can operate on a free-standing basis is unclear, although the relevant 
legal provisions are embedded in the laws of Northern Ireland and the Republic of 
Ireland. The range of issues to be considered include whether health services can 
continue to share staff, which will depend on continued mutual recognition of 
qualifications. Whether ambulances can continue to cross the border as now will 
also depend on the basis on which the products they carry are permitted to cross 
the border. 
Which EU health competences will be restored to the devolved jurisdictions post-
Brexit? What legal protections will representatives of the devolved jurisdictions 
have in the decision-making and process of restoring such health competences post-
Brexit? How will the devolved jurisdictions use their powers, and will health law 
become more diverse within the UK post-Brexit? What will be the implications for 
patients, and for health professionals, especially in border areas and particularly on 
the island of Ireland? How will the legal position of currently shared health facilities 
and the services of health professionals be secured? Will legal provision be made to 
secure continued funding for health projects, such as PEACE in Northern Ireland and 
Interreg in Scotland?
As many of these questions concern matters internal to the UK, and the laws 
underpinning its constitutional settlement, the type of Brexit and future EU-UK 
relationship is less relevant here than in the other health policy and practice 
questions considered above. The significant caveat is the potentially chaotic 
consequences of no Withdrawal Agreement for the island of Ireland. There, the 
comments above about the arrangements for people under the legal provisions that 
underpin the common travel area, and the provisions for products under WTO law 
and the imposition of a border on the island of Ireland, apply.
Former Member State Special Relationship 
127 J Curtis and others, 'Briefing Paper Number 8042, 17 July 2017. Brexit Negotiations: The Irish 
border question' (House of Commons Library 2017) Section 4. Free movement of people and the 
Common Travel Area.
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The draft settlement in the Withdrawal Agreement for the island of Ireland is based 
on a backstop agreement in principle, to the effect that, if no other solution is 
reached, a North/South hard border must be avoided.128 The UKs preferred 
solution here is through the overall EU-UK relationship, but no detail on how this 
will be achieved has yet been agreed.129 The May government is investigating 
technological solutions, but none are elaborated in sufficient detail to be acceptable 
to the EU. The Joint Negotiating text goes on to say:
In the absence of agreed solutions, the United Kingdom will maintain full 
alignment with those rules of the Internal Market and the Customs Union 
which, now or in the future, support North-South cooperation, the all- 
island economy and the protection of the 1998 Agreement. 
In the absence of agreed solutions, as set out in the previous paragraph, the 
United Kingdom will ensure that no new regulatory barriers develop 
between Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom, unless, 
consistent with the 1998 Agreement, the Northern Ireland Executive and 
Assembly agree that distinct arrangements are appropriate for Northern 
Ireland. In all circumstances, the United Kingdom will continue to ensure 
the same unfettered access for Northern Ireland's businesses to the whole 
of the United Kingdom internal market. 
Of course, this backstop provision will only apply if the EU agrees to the 
Withdrawal Agreement.
No Withdrawal Agreement
The EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018 provides that current restrictions on devolved 
competence, which arise because of the UKs obligations to comply with EU law, will 
be removed by the Act.130 However, there is a controversial exception to this default 
of devolved powers back to the devolved administrations. This comes under a 
power in the Act for UK ministers to freeze by Regulation aspects of existing EU law, 
and with it the constraints on competence.131 The intention then is to subsequently 
introduce new UK-wide legislative frameworks in these areas.132 At both the stage of 
making the freezing Regulations, and the future common frameworks, there is a 
128 European Commission and the United Kingdom Government, Joint Report from the Negotiators 
Of The European Union And The United Kingdom Government on progress during Phase 1 of 
negotiations under Article 50 TEU on the United Kingdoms orderly withdrawal from the European 
Union (European Commission 8 December 2017) para 49.
129 European Union and the United Kingdom, Joint Statement from the negotiators of the European 
Union and the United Kingdom Government on progress of negotiations under Article 50 TEU on the 
United Kingdoms orderly withdrawal from the European Union (19 June 2018) para 7.
130 European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, section 12.
131 European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, section 12.
132 Those areas have been identified following policy-specific intergovernmental deep-dives 
between officials  see the frameworks analysis 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/frameworks-analysis. 
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political undertaking133 by the UK government to not normally proceed without the 
consent of the devolved jurisdictions. However, there is significant concern that 
these assurances designed to protect the powers of the devolved jurisdictions do 
not in fact attract any enforceability through judicial process.134 The lack of legal 
enforceability of the so-called Sewel Convention (that Westminster will not 
normally legislate in devolved areas without devolved consent) was confirmed in 
the Miller judgment.135
But the legal/constitutional landscape is more than usually fluid and uncertain here. 
Scotland did not consent to the devolution parts of the EU (Withdrawal) Act. As we 
write, the Supreme Court is yet to rule136 on Scotlands UK Withdrawal from the 
European Union (Legal Continuity) (Scotland) Bill,137 which has been through the 
Scottish parliamentary process but has not yet received Royal Assent. This Bills aim 
is to secure continuity of EU law in Scotland, much as the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018 
does for the UK. But it also seeks to place on a legislative footing the Scottish 
governments understanding of its devolved powers and how Brexit affects those. A 
similar Act for Wales138 is to be repealed, following a political settlement.
Some of the areas identified in the frameworks analysis139 as matters which will 
rest with the devolved jurisdictions concern health policy and practice. These 
include elements of EU social security coordination (which is where EHIC sits; for 
Scotland and Northern Ireland); elements of employment law such as working time 
(in Northern Ireland only); and rules on genetically modified microorganisms 
(relevant for public health protection via the food chain). But some areas, such as 
access of non-UK nationals to benefits (which could include health care); medical 
devices regulation; data protection are in the areas identified by the UK government 
as reserved for UK-wide legislative frameworks. None of these is marked for 
consideration by the Department of Health and Social Care, which may be important 
when it comes to scrutiny of proposals, as ministries outside health ministries often 
miss health-related impacts of the legislation they sponsor. 
133 Intergovernmental Agreement on the EU (Withdrawal) Bill and the Establishment of Common 
Frameworks, 24 April 2018 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fil
e/702623/2018-04-24_UKG-DA_IGA_and_Memorandum.pdf.
134 So much so that the Scottish Parliament refused to give its legislative consent to the Withdrawal 
Act.
135 R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5.
136 BBC News: Supreme Court hears defence of Scottish Brexit Bill. 25 July 2018: 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-44938747.
137 UK Withdrawal from the European Union (Legal Continuity) (Scotland) Bill 
<https://digitalpublications.parliament.scot/ResearchBriefings/Report/2018/3/6/UK-Withdrawal-
from-the-European-Union--Legal-Continuity---Scotland--Bill> accessed 3 September 2018.
138 Law Derived from the European Union (Wales) Act 2018.
139 HM Government, Frameworks Analysis: Breakdown of areas of EU law that intersect with 
devolved competence in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland (HM Government 9 March 2018): 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/frameworks-analysis.
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Several areas of health policy are listed in the frameworks analysis where non-
legislative coordination may be required: these include health and safety at work 
(which is where working time sits in EU law); marketing authorisation for 
pharmaceuticals; transparency of pharmaceutical pricing; substances of human 
origin (excluding embryos and gametes); clinical trials and good laboratory practice; 
elements of tobacco regulation; and pandemic health threats. These are understood 
to be areas of devolved competence, where there is a need to coordinate matters at 
UK level, but in a way that falls short of UK-wide legislation.
However, the most important, and most contested, group of areas is that considered 
to be subject to more detailed discussion to explore whether common legislative 
frameworks may be needed, in whole or in part. These matters fall within devolved 
competence, but there is a claimed need for UK-wide legislation which harmonises 
matters for the whole of the UK. This list includes some very important matters for 
health policy and practice, such as public procurement, mutual recognition of 
professional qualifications, coordination of social security (EHIC), and a range of EU 
food law, such as food compositional standards, food and feed safety, and labelling, 
including nutrition and health claims.
Without any detailed legislative proposals it is impossible to analyse the effects of 
new legislation, or softer coordination, on health policy and practice, either at UK 
level, or in any of the devolved jurisdictions. In the case of the latter list, we do not 
even know which legislature (Westminster or one or more of the devolved 
legislatures) would be responsible for adopting the relevant new law.
CONCLUSIONS: A-LEGALITY IN POST-BREXIT HEALTH LAW
The overview of some of the most important issues for health law post-Exit Day 
above reveals significant  indeed probably unprecedented  levels of legal 
uncertainty.  EU law directly affects the areas we have discussed above, which of 
course exclude many aspects of UK health law.  But further, EU law indirectly affects 
many more domestically-determined aspects of UK health law,140 including, for 
instance, the law that governs the structures of the NHS and its operations, the types 
of treatments to which patients are entitled, and the circumstances in which they 
may access such treatment, tortious liability for medical harm, consent to treatment 
rules and other human rights protections, and so on.  Legal uncertainty about health 
post-Exit Day is thus significant, and, moreover, it is difficult to determine the extent 
of the uncertainty. The biggest challenges concern people and products, which is 
where we have focused our analysis. While there are a few aspects that are 
relatively clear, the majority of legal questions about the short term effects of Brexit 
on UK health law, policy and practice simply cannot be answered at present, as we 
do not have sufficient clarity in the legal texts that will govern relationships at that 
time.  That is probably the most important conclusion from our analysis.
140 Including through the Human Rights Act 1998, which is the primary mechanism by which the 
Council of Europes European Convention on Human Rights takes effect in the UK.
Page 43 of 46
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/MLI
Medical Law International
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
43
But one thing that is certain is that  unless something different is negotiated, and 
time is running short for that  the UK will leave the EU on 29 March 2019.  And 
there simply is no time to make the technical legal arrangements that will be 
necessary to ensure the smooth, orderly Brexit that the UK government claims it 
desires.141  Even with the powers in the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018 to adopt 
delegated legislation, and even if the UK and the EU agree the terms of withdrawal, 
there is scant time in the transition period envisaged by the Withdrawal Agreement 
to work through what changes will be needed to health law at UK level and in each 
of the UKs devolveds, and adopt those into legal text.  Effective scrutiny of those 
changes will be a remote possibility.  Parliaments in Westminster, Edinburgh, 
Cardiff and Stormont are over-stretched by the challenge of Brexit in general.  There 
is unlikely to be time or capacity to consult other health stakeholders142 who could 
provide effective scrutiny, and make sure leaving the EU does no harm to health.143  
If the UK leaves the EU at the eleventh hour without agreeing a Withdrawal 
Agreement, all of this will become impossible.  
Yet, unlike the airline industry, where it is expected that No Deal will mean an 
abrupt disruption of services,144 from 30 March 2019, the NHS will continue to 
provide care to patients, employ staff, contract with suppliers, and protect public 
health.  The NHS has been operating for longer than the 45 years that the UK has 
been a Member State of the EU, although of course its policies and practices have 
changed during that time in part because of the obligations of EU membership.  Just 
as Ellicksons cattle ranchers found ways to arrange their affairs, resolve liabilities 
and disputes so that they could continue to interact as neighbours, so we expect the 
myriad of actions and actors which make up the NHS in England, Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland to seek to continue as before. Where this involves interaction 
with our European neighbours, we predict that, at a micro level, the practice will be 
to aim for no change, or as little change as possible.  Some of this hoped-for 
continuity will be feasible on the basis of retained EU law.  Working time for health 
professionals, and recognition of health professional qualifications from EU-27 
Member States, for instance, will remain as is, at least in the short term, though with 
a different new source of UK law under the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018.  
141 Theresa May speech 17 January 2017. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-governments-negotiating-objectives-for-exiting-
the-eu-pm-speech. 
142 Although we note that the then Health Secretary, Jeremy Hunt, told the House of Commons Health 
Committee in oral evidence that he had met members of the global pharmaceutical industry, but not 
yet other health stakeholders. House of Commons Health Committee. Oral evidence: Brexit and 
health and social care, HC 640. 24 January 2017.
143 See the Faculty of Public Healths Do No Harm amendment, agreed by the Government during the 
passage of the EU (Withdrawal) Bill through the House of Lords.: https://www.fph.org.uk/policy-
campaigns/campaigns/brexit/a-do-no-harm-amendment-to-the-eu-withdrawal-bill/. 
144 For further detail see https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/legislation/brexit-
notice-to-stakeholders-aviation-safety.pdf.  
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But where the basis of the legal provision is not solely internally determined, 
however much individual actors involved may seek no change, and a continuity of 
existing neighbourly relations, this will not be always be possible.  For example, 
while the UK can decide to unilaterally recognise qualifications from EU-27 
countries, or authorized medicines or certified devices, the mutual recognition of 
medical qualifications, medicines or devices requires agreement from the EU.  And 
the processes that underpin that regulatory alignment involve institutional 
interactions, including sharing of expertise and data, that require such agreement 
too. 
Here the insights from socio-legal scholarship tell us to expect that social practice 
will not necessary follow the legal position. For instance, in the event of no 
Withdrawal Agreement, a Spanish hospital employing a UK doctor, or using a UK-
certified medical device, would be in breach of EU law by not immediately treating 
the doctor as a third country national and that device as non-compliant with EU 
product safety law. But it would take some time for enforcement procedures to 
come into play. Certainly in the short term, the EU is unlikely to be able to prevent 
the Spanish hospital from continuing to recognise the qualifications of a UK doctor 
working there or the safety of medical equipment which they have used for years. 
The position on the ground, th refore, would not represent the legal position: it 
would be a situation of a-legality.
But no entity wants to be in such a situation, and certainly not in the longer term. 
What we may see, therefore, is entities seeking to future-proof their existing 
relationships at a micro level, irrespective of the legal provisions that apply at macro 
level.  An early example in health is the concordat between the Royal College of 
Midwives and the Irish Nurses and Midwives Organisation.145 This seeks to Brexit-
proof mutual recognition of midwifery qualifications on the island of Ireland. 
Described as the first international collaboration of its kind, it will involve sharing 
learning resources and professional development, and the Irish Nurses and 
Midwives Organisation will offer future routes to influence in the European 
Commission for the Royal College of Midwives.  
And, furthermore, although a-legality offers some short-term solutions, we can 
expect problems to arise where the law is needed: where there is a dispute, for 
instance. Problems will also arise where the practical administrative aspects of 
continuity with what has gone before become impossible. Here, the extent to which 
law will determine street level action, of public or private actors or entities, is very 
difficult to predict. 
145 The Royal College of Midwives, 'RCM launches international partnership with INMO aimed at 
Brexit proofing midwifery learning and practice' (22 January 2018) < 
https://www.rcm.org.uk/news-views-and-analysis/news/%E2%80%98rcm-launches-international-
partnership-with-inmo-aimed-at-brexit> accessed 3 September 2018. 
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An NHS Trust, for instance, that regularly contracts with companies in EU-27 
countries to procure drugs, devices, or substances of human origin may well seek to 
continue its practice, whatever type of Brexit takes place. In the event of no 
Withdrawal Agreement being negotiated, how will officials processing (components 
of) health products that cross the UK-EU border to fulfil those contracts operate? 
The EU has indicated, in its Brexit preparedness notices,146 that it will treat such 
products as third country products: in other words, civil servants at the border of 
EU-27 countries will require paperwork and processes as if the product or 
component comes from a country with which the EU trades on WTO terms. That 
might well mean that health-related products, or components for those products, 
are held up at the border between, say, the UK and the Netherlands. The consequent 
increased costs may mean that companies seek to renegotiate contracts,147 or 
simply breach them by failing to supply products. There is an outside chance that 
lack of underpinning EU law, or any EU-UK agreement, may be treated as a 
legitimate frustrating circumstance, allowing non-compliance without breach.148 
Perhaps NHS contracts are being future-proofed already: there is scant formal 
evidence in the public domain on this matter.149 
Moreover, whether in practice products will be treated as if the UK were a third 
country on the island of Ireland, where the border is extremely porous, and physical 
infrastructure to check people and products crossing that border is non-existent, 
remains highly doubtful. In April 2019, will ambulance crews refuse to cross the 
NI/RoI border on small roads where the border is invisible in practice, if that is the 
quickest way to get a patient to hospital in an emergency, for fear that the products 
in the ambulance breach WTO trade rules? We think not.
In the analysis above, we have sought neither to under- nor over-state the 
importance of law in post-Brexit health policy and practice.  The kind of legal 
analysis that will be necessary to understand the rights and obligations of all kinds 
of entities, and of human beings, in the future, needs legal texts that are not available 
146 European Commission, Read more on Brexit preparedness notices: 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/brexit-preparedness/brexit-notices-explanation_en. 
147 There are some indications that contracts are being re-negotiated against a no deal Brexit at the 
present time, for instance through discussions on social media.
148 Under English law the doctrine of frustration of contract states that a contract may be set aside if 
an unforeseen event renders contractual obligations impossible or whose purpose is thwarted 
through no fault of the contracting parties:  Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943.  However 
in this case it is unlikely that a contract is actually frustrated as it can still be performed, just with 
greater expense (e.g. the paperwork and processes associated with trading on WTO terms, rather 
than under a FTA or EU law).
149 A Twitter thread on 13 August @JasonJHunter highlighted the position of a global company that 
manufactures in the UK, importing raw material from the EU, with a 4-5 month delivery period. Given 
that the company cannot know the terms of import from April 2019 onwards, how can it place an 
order in November 2018? The supplier will surely decline the order if they do not know the costs of 
delivery, shipping time (i.e. time held up at ports), insurance, and so on. This company is also a 
supplier to other companies which process their product for another 3-6 months and have the same 
questions for the UK company about 2019 deliveries. Therefore, says the Twitter thread, is the UK 
going to be short of life saving products for 8 months or more?.
Page 46 of 46
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/MLI
Medical Law International
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
46
at this time, even though Exit Day is less than 8 months away. By setting out the key 
questions that will need to be answered for post-Brexit UK health law, and 
answering those that can be answered at this time, this paper is a step along the way. 
But without legal text, we can go no further with that research agenda. Instead, we 
have offered an analysis based on the uncertainties that our paper has uncovered.
In short, we expect that the law will be less of a reflection of reality in the immediate 
post-Brexit period in the context of health than it is at present.  Until the legal texts 
catch up, we expect a period of a-legality, where law is less of a determinant of 
policy and practice than it has been before. 
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